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ABSTRACT
Small local governmental units are responsible for
allocating resources on behalf of a substantial portion of
all United States citizens.

The research reported here

investigates the effects of presentation format (or framing)
on decision preference in a governmental resource allocation
context.

The subjects represent a population of

governmental units which has not received prior research
attention— small local governments.

Budget preparers were

asked to choose among objectively identical alternatives,
which differed in presentation formats.

The cases used to

investigate the effects of presentation were modelled after
Kahneman and Tversky's [1979] seminal work in prospect
theory, which addressed violations of expected utility
theory.
The survey's approximately 50% response rate provided
results indicating that the subjects of this study cannot be
considered "rational decision makers" as defined by the well
accepted expected utility theory.

However, most of their

decision behavior could be explained with the concepts of
prospect theory.

The implications of this research include

the need for further investigation of the resource
allocation process of small local governments.

Readers

should note that this study and its findings are based on
responses to structured cases, which may not be
vii

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

representative of the subject's actual decision making
environment.

Further research is necessary to determine

whether similar results can be associated with subjects
operating within their natural budgetary decision making
environment in the absence of such structured cases.

The

fact that approximately 25% of the United States population
is served by these small governments suggests the need for
continued research.

Vlll
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The objective of the proposed research study is to
contribute to the governmental budgeting and behavioral
research knowledge base in two principal ways.

First, the

study will focus on the decisions of local governmental unit
budgeting management (or officials).

A review of relevant

literature suggests that empirical evidence is sparse in
regard to behavioral aspects of the budgeting process,
including resource allocation, at the level of the local
governmental unit.

Second, prospect theory, which has

received considerable attention in recent psychology and
business literature, is used to determine whether a more
complete understanding of the budgetary decision making
process under uncertainty may be obtained, as compared to
the more widely applied expected utility explanation of the
process.
The concepts of prospect theory are summarized in the
proposal and employed in the research design.

Subjects'

decision responses will be examined for empirical evidence
of violations regarding the fundamental elements of rational
choice behavior, consistence and coherence.

Results of the

study may indicate a need for improvement of the existing
approach to budgeting decisions at the local level (e.g.,
incorporation of deliberate decision frames into typical
resource allocation decisions).

The next section of this

1
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chapter provides a brief review of the governmental
budgeting and prospect theory literatures, and is followed
by a presentation of the proposed research methodology.

The

chapter concludes with a discussion of the contributions and
relevance of the study.
Background
THE BUDGETING ENVIRONMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Resource allocation is a major concern to all members
of any organization.

This is true whether the organization

is as global in perspective as the entire human race, or as
focused in perspective as small task groups with a single,
well-defined objective.

Kee, Robbins, and Apostolou [1987,

p. 16] identify the allocation of scarce resources among
alternatives as "one of the most important tasks municipal
administrators must undertake."

The allocation process is

rarely a strictly quantitative one.

For almost every

decision made regarding resource allocation, numerous
qualitative issues must be addressed.

This is especially

true in the public sector, where political and social
considerations often take precedence over financial
analysis.
in society.

Thus, behavioral research has an important role
Such research has worked toward an

understanding of the decision making processes in managerial
roles under conditions of both certainty and uncertainty.
As our understanding grows with regard to decision making
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behavior, we should be more capable of improving processes
which involve uncertainty, such as resource allocation.
Many authors have expressed the view that this is a
time when local governmental units are being forced to make
more efficient and effective resource allocations than ever
before.1

According to Naisbett [1984, p. 103], "State and

local governments are the most important political entities
in America."

Americans have become more politically aware

on a local level.

While voter turnout is embarrassingly low

for national elections, Naisbett notes a sharp contrast for
local issues.

He cites turnouts for initiatives and

referenda increasing to over 75% in some areas of the United
States.

Blubaugh [1987, p. 8] notes, "More and more voters

themselves are demanding to be a part of the governmental
decision process."

Demands are growing for greater bottom-

up participation in policy-making as people affected by
local government decisions are becoming more a part of the
decision making process.

Furthermore, Luke [1986, p. 134]

believes the increasing numbers of neighborhood groups are
becoming more sophisticated and more politically powerful.
They are demanding more and monitoring government actions
more closely.

All of this is happening at a time when the

federal government has placed greater resource allocation
burdens on local governments by restructuring grant programs
^Recent examples include Naisbett (1984); Kee, Robbins,
and Apostolou (1987); Luke (1986); Cothran (1986); and Sharp
(1986).
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and reducing f u n d i n g . ^

interestingly, Luke [1986, p. 135]

finds that local governments are now the principal providers
of most domestic services nation-wide, which puts the scarce
resource allocation decision primarily in the hands of local
governments.
Major changes in the U.S. economy, such as the
continuous technological innovation, have affected the local
governments' budgeting environment.

Margolis [1987] states

that political pressures have increased as a result of
changing technology, which has not only increased the amount
of leisure time citizens have available for monitoring
public officials but has also improved transportation and
communication to aid in such monitoring efforts.

In

addition, the tremendous changes in computer technology and
availability have changed the budgeting environment faced by
local officials.
As a result of changing technology and data producing
capabilities, local administrators of the near future must
be capable of selecting and focusing attention on the few
salient issues present within the sea of information
available to the officials.

Officials (or managers) must be

able to think strategically, which includes determining what
^Reagan's "New Federalism" has been aimed at shifting
decision making from the federal to state & local levels of
government. Also, Luke [1986] notes that the funding
reversals have changed state and local relationships as
perceived by local government managers and have led to the
constituency's negative perceptions as well as lower
employee morale.
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kind of information is needed to assist in a particular
policy choice or program decision [Luke, 1986, p. 136].
These technological changes suggest that local governing
officials must be increasingly careful in their selection of
information for analysis, as well as in the actions chosen
to serve their constituency, which has grown significantly
in strength.

For the many locally elected officials who are

seeking to make careers of holding public office, current
daily decisions must be made with both the community and
their own career interests in mind.3

As a result of the

increased pressure and perhaps intimidation that
constituencies are placing on elected officials,

Blubaugh

[1987, p. 9] has noted that considerable turmoil exists ". .
. in the delivery of local government services, more so than
ever before."

Interestingly, over a decade ago, Hobbs

[1971, p. 49] noted the expected population increase for
many rural communities long accustomed to decline and
suggested the need for "effective planning organizations
capable of estimating participatory ways of meeting service
needs."
The developments identified above have a significant
impact on the state of local government, and an awareness of

^Blubaugh [1987] discusses this in his article
addressing the public administrator's changing role. Also,
Luke [1986, p. 135] refers to the Freedom of Information Act
as another source for concern among local officials due to
the easier access to data which was previously unavailable
to their constituency.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

6
such issues may be used to effectively shape local
governments into organizations capable of meeting the varied
needs of their constituencies.

As Luke [1987, p. 132]

states, " (these issues) are challenges that create problems
worth solving as well as opportunities worth anticipating."
The change in the local government environment suggests that
the decision making capability of budget personnel and the
effects of the decision making environment on those
personnel warrant consideration.

Yet, a review of the

literature suggests that empirical evidence is sparse to
nonexistent in regard to behavioral aspects of the budgeting
process of local governments.
SMALL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS & ASPECTS OF THE BUDGETING PROCESS
Cothran [1986] defines small government as
jurisdictions serving populations of less'than 10,000.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Census Statistical Abstract
[1986, p. 286], governments serving less than 10,000 people
compose 94% of all townships, 88% of all municipalities, 24%
of all counties, and serve approximately 25% of the entire
U.S. population.

Together with the increasing activism of

citizens in local governmental affairs (as discussed in the
previous section), these percentages emphasize the
importance of small governments and their potential impact
on

society.

Yet, local government research has not

adequately addressed the issues of small governments.
Cornia and Usher [1981, p. 75] point out that most
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governmental budgeting research is focused on state and
federal levels and generalized (perhaps unjustifiably) to
municipal budgeting.

They found very little empirical

research addressing local budgeting, even though local
expenditures were approaching 10% of GNP at the time of
their research.

Stallings and Ferris [1988, p. 583]

reviewed public administration research for the 45 year
period of 1940 through 1984 and found that local government
has never been a major focus for governmental research.4
Hy, Waugh, and Nelson [1987, p. 136] may provide an
explanation for such a lack of empirical research.

They

state:
While administrators have become aware of the need for
an operating theory or framework for postulating
relationships between and among variables or factors
and for constructing testable hypotheses, the tools for
doing so have not been adequately assimilated. One of
the reasons may be that public administration education
has not provided the necessary analytical skills and
perspectives to frame major or administrative questions
in testable and generalizable forms.
The Council of Developmental Choices maintains that to meet
the changing needs of the 1980s, all who participate in the
development process must be willing to change the status quo
[Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1981, p. xii].

^Local government research was found to increase
slightly in the early 1960s, but has remained constant as a
very small portion of published articles. The authors
reviewed work in Public Administration Review due to their
regard for the journal as the official professional
publication within the field and their belief that it would
be most representative of research of general interest to
the profession.
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Until the survey conducted by Kee et al. [1987], no
attempt had been made to assess the state of municipal
governments' budgeting practices.

The survey focused

primarily on the area of capital budgeting, which Cothran
[1986, p. 32] identifies as one of the more difficult
aspects of budgeting and one of the twelve elements of
financial management and planning listed by the
International City Management Association (ICMA).

Kee et

al. [1987, p. 22] found that political and social
considerations, which may be directly linked to risk, can
have significant influence over asset selection in the
public sector.

Of the 200 municipal finance officers

surveyed, 79% of the respondents indicated that the degree
of investment risk is a primary consideration in the
selection of capital projects.

Furthermore, 39% of the

respondents rely on nonquantitative procedures in the
analysis of risk.

Consequently, the authors found highly

subjective and unsophisticated methods of risk analysis and
capital project selection to be employed more frequently
than such sophisticated approaches as net present value
(NPV) or internal rate of return (IRR).^

It seems

reasonable to presume that smaller local governments than

^Kee, et al. [1987] randomly selected and surveyed 200
municipal finance officers of cities having populations of
at least 50,000. The authors achieved a 49% response rate.
These cities were found to have reasonably well-educated and
experienced officers and perhaps more structured budgeting
approaches than might be found in smaller governments.
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those surveyed by Kee et al. are employing methods of even
less sophistication and objectivity.

As Cothran [1986, p.

31] notes;
Small governments often lack strong chief executives
such as city or county managers to prepare and review
the budget. Therefore, several officials in small
communities divide the tasks usually performed by a
strong chief executive in larger systems, although one
official— usually the elected clerk— coordinates the
process and compiles departmental requests for
presentation to the local legislature.
Using the standards of larger and more sophisticated
governments, Sokolow and Hondale [1984, p. 377] failed to
identify a single administrator of rural jurisdictions as a
"professional" budget officer.

This may be considered a

major problem in local government.

Small governments are

the primary provider of domestic services and are under the
increasing scrutiny of their citizenry regarding the
allocation of scarce resources to those services.

Yet,

small governments are most susceptible to constraints
imposed by limited resources (both monetary and human),
which aid in the accomplishment of such an arduous task.
One of the major problems emphasized above is that very
little empirical research has been directed at the local
government level.

Most state and federal level research has

simply been projected onto local governments.
is seemingly unjustified.

This practice

Similarly, the little research

which does exist regarding local government activity,
perhaps unjustifiably, has been generalized to smaller local
governments, which are probably profoundly less
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sophisticated than the larger local governments studied to
date.6
EFFECTS OF FRAMING ON DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Local government resource allocation decisions are
becoming increasingly difficult in light of decreased
federal support and increased public activism.

Such

decisions may be classified as decisions involving
uncertainty, given the political and social ramifications
everpresent in the public sector and the diversity of
interest groups demanding satisfaction of their specific
needs.

However, Gibbins [1984, p. 103] states that there is

insufficient knowledge of what happens when experienced
people employ judgment in decision making situations of
significance, "amid the pressures, constraints, dangers, and
opportunities of their everyday environment."

Thus,

attention to the decision making process in an environment
of uncertainty appears warranted.
Until the late 1970s, most literature focusing or
building on the concept of rational choice in situations of
uncertainty relied on the expected utility hypothesis of
behavior?, which assumes decision-makers, given new
information, consistently use a Bayesian learning model and
®See chapter 2 for a discussion of differences between
state and local levels of government as well as between
smaller and larger local governments.
^Influential, early work includes Mosteller and Nogee
[1951] and Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel [1957].
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conditional probability information to update their beliefs.
As Arrow [1982, p. 1] notes:
In good measure, the expected-utility hypothesis
provided an important starting point for these studies
(regarding the capacity of human beings for perception
and judgment), in the sense that it provided a
refutable hypothesis and indeed one for which the
testing of implications was rather straightforward.
One significant research effort testing the
implications of expected-utility theory was Lichtenstein and
Slovic's [1971] work with choices between pairs of gambles,
resulting in the "preference-reversal" phenomenon.
Lichtenstein and Slovic found that subjects often equate a
lower guaranteed dollar amount with the subjects' preferred
gamble, which contradicts the postulates of rationality (see
Figure 1.1).

Similarly, Arrow [1982] notes several research

efforts which have shown that a fundamental element of
rationality, extensionality®, may not be applicable to
choice.
Kahneman and Tversky [1979]

emphasize the importance

of descriptions in their development of prospect theory.
They have found that significant differences exist between
choices made when objectively identical situations are
framed (or described) in terms of gains rather than in terms
of losses.

This is referred to as the "context effect"

®Extensionality suggests that choice depends on the set
of alternatives from which the choice can be made. A change
in description of objectively identical alternatives should
not change the decision or choice.
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FIGURE 1.1
An Illustration of Preference Reversal Effects*

Subjects are told that they have the opportunity to throw a
single dart. They may throw the dart at either target A or
target B. The payoffs are as follows:
Target A:

$4 - dart hits anywhere within target A,
except on the radius line.
$0 - dart hits the radius line of target A.

Target B:

$16 - dart hits within shaded portion of
target B.
$0 - dart hits outside the shaded portion.

Target A

Target B

0
Subjects must choose between A or B. Once they have
indicated their preference, they are asked to calculate the
expected value for each target. Subjects who first choose A
do tend to then calculate a higher expected value for B.

Example was taken from Professor Charles Plott's
presentation during the 1988 AAA Doctoral Student
Consortium.
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or "framing".

For example, Tversky and Kahneman [1981]

asked subjects to respond to the following objectively
identical situations:
The U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual
Asian disease which is expected to kill 600 people.
Two alternative programs are being considered. Which
would you favor? (158 subjects were given a choice
between Programs A & B, and 169 subjects were given a
choice between Programs C & D).
1. If Program A is adopted, 200 will be saved.
2. If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third
probability that all will be saved and a two-thirds
probability that none will be saved.
3. If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
4. If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third
probability that no one will die and a two-thirds
probability that 600 people will die.
Seventy-six percent of the first group of respondents chose
Program A.
&

While the expected utilities of both programs (A

B) were equal,

more

respondentsvalued the sure 200 lives saved

than the risky prospect of equal expected value.

However, only 13% of the respondents chose Program C (given
the choice of C or D), which is equal to the preferred
Program A— saving 200 lives and losing 400.
When given a choice between a sure loss of 400 lives
and a two-thirds chance at losing all 600 lives, respondents
tended to be risk-seeking and hoped for the long shot of not
losing any lives.

It was a result of noting such

inconsistencies of expected utility theory, which predicts
no change in response when objectively identical situations
are described differently, that led Tversky and Kahneman to
the development of prospect theory, which presents
explanations for inconsistent responses in terms of risk-
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averse and risk-seeking tendencies of individuals perceiving
situations from different perspectives (or reference
points).

Prospect theory predicts risk-averse behavior when

individuals are confronted with an evaluation of gains and
risk-seeking behavior when individuals are confronted with
an evaluation of losses.
This approach seems particularly appropriate for the
analysis of the decision making process of local officials.
As Luke [1986, p. 134] notes in his discussion of the role
of the local administrator of the 1990s, "Managing strategic
information is essentially a problem-setting process, where
problems are identified and assessed, rather than a problem
solving process."
Bazerman et al. [1985, p. 310] extend a call for
research to investigate " . . .
behaviors of their opponents."

how negotiators can frame the
Given the environment of

local government decision making, prospect theory appears to
be a viable approach to investigating any violations of
rationality made by individuals responsible for the
allocation of scarce resources.

If violations are present,

the concepts of prospect theory may prove useful in
educating governmental decision makers.

As Kahneman and

Tversky [1979, p. 277] claim:
Such anomalies (departures from expected utility
theory) of preference are normally corrected by the
decision maker when he realizes that his preferences
are inconsistent, intransitive, or inadmissible. In
many situations, however, the decision maker does not
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have the opportunity to discover that his preferences
could violate decision rules that he wishes to obey.
The reality of scarce resources and the competition for
those resources among interested parties has contributed to
an increasing activism among constituencies, all of whom
must present their needs to the government for consideration
in the allocation process.

While the constituency must

present a request for allocation, it does hold the power to
vote for the decision makers currently in office.

Thus,

governmental decision makers must be careful to evaluate all
needs of its constituency and justify all allocation
decisions, which necessarily involves the denial of requests
of some other constituencies.
The act of framing may exist in the constituency's
presentation to the governmental unit— emphasizing the need
for resource allocation in particular directions.

Thus,

governmental decision makers should be made aware of the
implications of framing on the quality of their decisions.
Furthermore, once resource allocation decisions have been
carefully made by the governmental unit, the unit should be
aware of the usefulness of framing in the presentation of
its decisions to the constituency.

Many times there is no

right answer to problems faced by governmental decision
makers, yet decisions must be made.

There will always be

some part of the constituency which opposes the chosen
action.

Awareness of the views of such individuals may help
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decision makers present the same objective information to
such people in the most palatable frame.
Research Objectives
RESEARCH QUESTION
Several of the works cited above have extended calls
for additional research.

These calls emphasize significant

gaps in the current governmental budgeting literature.

This

study responds to the call for additional research by
focusing on a managerial accounting issue within a small,
local governmental entity.

Kahneman and Tversky's [1979]

concept of prospect theory (as discussed in the following
chapter) will be employed to develop and test hypotheses.
The objective of the study is to determine empirically
whether local government officials' budgeting decisions are
affected by altering the frame of the various resource
allocation alternatives under consideration.

If such an

effect is found, awareness of the impact of framing may
serve to improve resource allocation decisions through the
development of more comprehensive budget planning systems.
For example, systems may be employed which prompt budgeting
managers to address all pertinent issues prior to making
resource allocation decisions among alternatives.®

In other

words, budget planning systems may be improved to draw
attention to decisions in violation of statistically
®Northcraft and Neale [1986] present work in this area.
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sophisticated decision models such as a Bayesian or expected
utility approach.

While there is often no right answer for

decision makers to select, local governmental decision
makers should see the importance of not being misled into
selection of an inferior course of action as a result of the
mere presentation of the alternatives, rather than the
objective differences among the alternatives.
HYPOTHESES AND VARIABLES
Although the debate continues over the definition of
rationality, there is wide acceptance of the belief that
rational choice must be consistent and coherent [T&K, 1981,
p. 453].

Consistency is assessed in terms of the subjects'

decision preferences, which should not change as a result of
alternative framing (i.e., rewording) of the same decision
problem.

Coherence of the subjects' decision preferences

can be assessed in terms of deviations from the expected
utility solutions for the decision problems.

T&K have

analyzed the responses of numerous different types of
subjects (e.g., undergraduates, academicians, and physi
cians) to cases similar to the cases employed in this study
(see below).10

Their results indicate that even the more

sophisticated subjects, such as academicians, systematically
violate the theory of rational choice.

This study will

lOgee chapter 3 for a detailed explanation of case
selection and design. See Figure 1 of chapter 3 for the
cases employed in this study.
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examine the responses of local governmental unit budgeting
managers (or officials) for violations of rational choice.
The proposition (P) of interest is stated below:
P:

Budgeting managers tend to respond inconsistently
and incoherently to objectively identical resource
allocation alternatives framed differently.

Thus, the null hypotheses can be stated as:
HI:

The budget manager will not alter his decision
preferences between different frames of the same
contingency.

H2:

The budget manager will not alter his decision
preferences between different frames of the same
outcome.

H3:

The budget manager will choose the alternative
which maximizes expected utility.

Rejection of these hypotheses will lend support to the
claims that explanations of decision making processes
require more than an assumption of rational choice behavior
or an expected utility approach.

That is, rejection

suggests that local budgeting managers do not respond
consistently (primarily related to HI and H2) and coherently
(H?) .
The dependent variable is the manager's choice or
preference among alternatives related to the decision
problem.

This variable is dichotomous for each of the

decision cases used in the study.
is the frame of the decision case.
three separate aspects of framing:

The independent variable
Although T&K identify
acts, outcomes and

contingencies, the current study will be limited to the
framing of contingencies and outcomes.

This is seen as a
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necessary limitation to this research attempting to keep the
necessary sample size at a reasonable level.

Moreover, it

is believed that the increased length of the instrument
which would be required to adequately test all three aspects
of framing would have a negative impact on the response
rate.
Methodoloov
A sample of subjects will be randomly drawn from the
U.S. Bureau of Census 1987 Directory of Governments listing
of local governments serving populations of no more than
1 0 ,0 0 0 .

Subjects will be mailed a survey.

The survey response

form will be printed on bifold heavy gauge paper, which will
require the subjects simply to fold the pre-addressed and
stamped instrument, staple and mail.

The brevity required

to employ such a form, along with the convenience, should
increase response rates.

Accompanying the instrument will

be a cover letter emphasizing the lack of attention paid to
smaller local governments in the professional literature to
date and the importance of their response in helping to fill
that void.

Subjects will be encouraged to return the

instrument even if they choose not to participate in the
study.

To the extent this request is honored, this should

eliminate doubt regarding subjects' receipt of the
instrument, and thus eliminate one explanation for non
response.

In addition, the survey will be sent by first
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class mail rather than bulk rate in an effort to get the
recipients' attention initially.

The instrument will

consist of a section for demographics and a few short cases.
CASE DESIGN & ANALYSES.
The cases will be designed to detect violations of
expected utility theory in scenarios involving uncertainty
in a resource allocation context.
The literature review served to emphasize several
issues which seemingly require governmental decision makers
at the local level to make decisions under conditions of
uncertainty.

For example, a review of the study published

by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) [1981], which addressed the changing needs of the
1980's, provided some insight into the issues to be
presented in the experimental cases.

HUD and other sources

in the current literature address the importance of
maintaining infrastructure and the problems associated with
such activity.

Hoffman, Mister and Strawser [1988] discuss

the decreasing availability of federal funds for local
governments' infrastructure repair, replacement, or
expansion needs.

This situation of decreasing funds

accompanied by increasing citizen activism (or expression of
needs) makes the resource allocation decision making
behavior of local officials an important issue.

Similarly,

the issue of unemployment and the need to layoff government
employees is one of concern to many.

Employment issues tend
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to draw attention nationwide, and certainly are of interest
to local constituencies.
Case construction is very important to the analysis of
decision making behavior in this study.

In their

introduction of prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky [1979]
explained the use of individual cases to detect violations
of rational decision making behavior.

In addition, they

explained the use of relationships among (or between)
multiple cases to support violations found with individual
cases as well as to detect further violations.

The cases

presented in chapter 3 have attempted to incorporate the
characteristics of Kahneman and Tversky's cases in a manner
which allows analysis on an individual and a multiple case
level.

The problems below illustrate how different frames

may be used to present objectively identical options to
these decision makers, invoking different responses.
Consider the following:
Decision makers may be faced with objectively
identical alternatives presented in one of the
following ways (problems 1 & 2 below). Regardless of
the presentation form, the decision makers would be
told that they have no hopes of obtaining the federal
funding in question without the aid of the federal aid
coordinator's expertise.
PROBLEM 1:
Your government has begun negotiations to hire a
federal aid coordinator in efforts to improve your
chances of obtaining federal funding for capital
improvements and special programs. You know that the
applicants for the coordinator position are also
negotiating with other governmental units, and you
estimate that you have a 25% chance of hiring one of
the applicants. If you hire one of the specialists
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you feel absolutely confident that the coordinator can
secure $150,000 for capital improvements by focusing
all energies on a specific strategy, and you are 80%
confident that the coordinator can secure $200,000 by
pursuing an alternative strategy. Preliminary
paperwork must be submitted for approval by the council
before the hiring process is expected to be completed.
Which one of the coordinator strategies would you
choose to present to the council?
Strategy A:
Strategy B:

($150,000)
or
($200,000, .80)

PROBLEM 2;
Your government's federal aid coordinator has two
strategic options available for the current period's
consideration. Option Z has a 20% chance of resulting
in federal aid of $200,000. Option Y has a 25% chance
of resulting in federal aid of $150,000. Which option
would you encourage the coordinator to pursue:
Option Z:
Option Y:

($200,000, .2)
($150,000, .25)

or

Researchers have found that even decidedly
sophisticated decision makers experience what T&K have
termed the "isolation effect" when faced with similarly
structured decision scenarios.

That is, they ignore

elements in the decision process that are shared by all
alternatives.

In the example case, decision makers are

expected to ignore the 25% chance of securing the
coordinator (as expressed in problem 1) because both actions
depend on successful completion of that initial part of the
process.

Rational decision theory expects decision makers

to integrate the stages and not ignore the initial 25%
chance.
maker.

Problem 2 integrates the steps for the decision
That is, 20% is derived from the joint probabilities

(25%— chance of reaching stage 2— and 80%).

When faced with
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the alternatives in the integrated problem, decision makers
make the rational choice of higher expected value.

This

study will rely on a pilot study to investigate whether
subjects ignore (or isolate) either the probability or the
absolute dollar amount of the options in Problem 2 when
making their decisions.

When faced with the alternatives in

the nonintegrated problem, decision makers have been found
not to choose the higher expected value of the second step.
Ignoring the effect of the first step, they often select the
"sure" thing over a chance for a little something more.
This has been termed the "certainty effect."

Remarkably,

researchers have found subjects tend not to integrate even
when prompted to do so.

Thus, the decisions made can be

significantly different for alternative presentations of
objectively identical information.

The isolation and

certainty effects are addressed in chapter two along with a
more detailed presentation of prospect theory and framing.
In addition, efforts to maximize the experimental
realism of the task will include solicitation of comments
from a city manager.

Once the instrument has been reviewed

and modified where necessary, a pilot study will be
conducted using Baton Rouge area small government managers
as subjects.

The pilot study should allow possible sources

of confusion with the task to be detected as well as
indicate potential weaknesses in the methodology, in
general.
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Subjects will be asked to choose between alternative
courses of action (such as the above example) requiring
equal allocations of available resources.

This is to remove

budget limitations as a reason for proposal rejection.
Subjects' responses will be compared to the expected
utility response frequencies anticipated for each set of
alternatives.

Deviations from expected utility solutions

will be analyzed in light of the principles of prospect
theory.

For instance, as explained with the above example,

rational decision theory assumes decision makers will choose
the highest expected utility alternative based on integrated
information in the case of two-stage decision problems.
Prospect theory proposes that decision makers ignore the
common elements among alternatives (e.g., the 25% chance of
moving on to step two of the decision problem) and base
their decision on the illusory certainty (or
pseudocertainty) associated with the unique elements of the
alternatives.

In addition to the investigation for

isolation effects, the cases will investigate the effects of
framing alternatives in terms of gains or losses from the
decision maker's reference point.

This issue is discussed

in greater detail in chapter two; however, a brief
description follows.

l^Kee et al. [1987] found limited funds to be the most
important reason for rejecting investment proposals.
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Basically, prospect theory explains risk aversion and
risk seeking behavior by focusing on the decision maker's
point of reference.

Whereas expected utility theory assumes

that decision makers will respond consistently to various
framings of objectively identical information, prospect
theory finds that decision makers are influenced by the
perspective forced on them by the decision frame.

When the

decision problem is framed in terms of a gain from the
decision maker's reference point prospect theory anticipates
risk averse behavior in the choice among alternatives.

When

the objectively identical information is framed in terms of
a loss from the decision maker's reference point, prospect
theory anticipates risk seeking behavior.
Responses to the cases will be evaluated in terms of
the consistency and coherency requirements of rational
choice theory.

Coherence will be analyzed by comparing the

correct expected utility solutions (in applicable cases—
some cases will be identical to the alternative in terms of
expected utility, i.e., no "correct" solution) to the
observed decision preferences.

For example, the case

presented earlier in this chapter has a correct response
(i.e., the alternatives are not of equal expected value).
Rational decision theory requires decision makers to choose
alternative B in problem 1, based on integrated information
regarding the two-step problem, and alternative Z in problem
2.

Consistency will be analyzed by comparing the
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frequencies of directional preferences (risk aversion or
risk seeking) as discussed below.
Each case elicits dichotomous responses which satisfy
the criteria for classification as binomial distributions
[Levin, 1984, p. 215].

In testing whether the sample data

support the null hypothesis that the sampled population
responses do follow binomial distributions, the Chi-square
goodness-of-fit test will be employed, given scenarios where
the expected utility between alternatives is objectively
identical.

That is, the Chi-square test will be used where

the expected frequencies are 50%-50% for the two alternative
courses of action.

According to Daniel [1978, p. 256], the

goodness-of-fit test should not be used for categories with
an expected frequency of less than one, such as where one
alternative is objectively better.

Consequently, a

nonparametric binomial test will be used to analyze
responses to scenarios which have alternatives of different
expected utilities (e.g., the example case above).
Expected Contribution
Several of the works cited above have extended calls
for additional research.

These calls emphasize significant

gaps in the current governmental budgeting and psychology of
choice literatures.

This study suggests that the call for

additional research be answered by focusing on a managerial
accounting issue within a local governmental entity.

By

employing prospect theory the study will attempt to

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

27
determine empirically whether local government managers'
budgeting decisions are affected by altering the frame of
the various resource allocation alternatives under
consideration.

If such an effect is found, awareness of the

impact of framing may serve to improve resource allocation
decisions through the development and incorporation of more
comprehensive budget planning systems.
This chapter provides background information concerning
the budgeting environment of local governments and some
behavioral aspects of the budgeting process at the local
government level.

The chapter also defines the purpose and

objectives of the proposed study.

The research effort is

viewed as a worthwhile focus in light of the numerous calls
for expansion of the governmental budgeting and behavioral
research knowledge base.

The demographic data collected

should be of significant interest, given claims of
insufficient empirical focus to date on small local
governmental units.

For example, the literature claims that

local budget managers are appointed rather than elected as
in state and federal governmental units.

Demographics

collected by this study will provide empirical evidence to
support or refute that claim.
The prospect theory approach is believed to be
warranted because of its potential contributions (above
those of expected utility theory) toward a more complete
understanding of the decision making process under
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uncertainty.

A better understanding of the planning/

decision making aspects of the budgetary process may have
significant practical implications for the local government
entity as well as its constituents.

Once a weakness in a

system (such as framing of resource allocation options
without conscious awareness) is identified, remedial steps
can be implemented.

Such steps might include development of

intentionally structured frames which induce sufficient
consideration of all resource allocation options available
to the budget manager.

As Naisbett [1984] noted, the

demands placed on local governmental units are growing in
number and intensity.

A better understanding of the status

of decision making within such units may allow for improved
approaches to the task and a more favorable working
environment for the decision making personnel.
Summary
This chapter has been employed as an introduction to
the proposed study and relevant background.

The need for

increased attention to the resource allocation decisions
made by local governments has been addressed, and the
perceived benefit of a prospect theory approach to decision
making under such conditions of uncertainty has been
presented.

The remaining chapters will include a review of

literatures relevant to local government and decision
making, a detailed explanation of the proposed methodology,
analysis of the data, and conclusions of the research.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE RELEVANT TO THE STUDY
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL DECISION MAKING
IN THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS
The purpose of chapter two is to provide a review and
summary of literature relevant to this research.

This

chapter will also highlight the contributions to the
literature which will be made by the current study.

The

relevant research areas include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Literature on the theory or concepts of the
budgeting function,
Reviews of work on local governments,
Empirical budgeting research at the local level,
The introduction and development of prospect
theory, and
Applications of prospect theory in accounting and
business.
The Budgeting Function

SCHICK
Schick's [1966] essay, "The Road to PPB: The Stages to
Budget Reform," is viewed as a significant contribution to
governmental budgeting theory.

His presentation of the

functions of budgeting has been used by academicians and
practitioners interested in understanding the literature and
practices of budgeting.

The value of the essay is seen to

be the development of the general constructs which lay a
foundation (or conceptual framework) for the design and
performance of empirical research in budgeting.

Schick

maintains that the budget and the budgetary process is a
29
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means of (1) control - insuring legal compliance and
monitoring spending; (2) management - delivering services in
an efficient manner; and (3) planning - establishing goals
and evaluating alternative courses of action.

According to

Schick, American governments' emphasis in the budgeting
process has progressed over time from the former to the
latter of his constructs.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
In 1978, the Comptroller General of the United States
published twelve standards for internal management control,
three of which validate the importance of Schick's [1966]
three functions of budgeting.

One additional standard

(No.8) is believed to be relevant to the focus of this
research effort, and is presented last.

The specific

standards of interest to the current study are presented as
[1978, p.35]:
Standard No.l: Policies. Management policies adopted
for carrying out agency functions should be clearly
stated; systematically communicated throughout the
organization; conformed to applicable laws and external
regulations and policies; and designed to promote the
carrying out of authorized activities effectively,
efficiently, and economically.
Standard No.4: Planning. A system of forward
planning, embracing all significant parts of the
agency, is needed for determining and justifying needs
for financial, property, and personnel resources and
for carrying out operations effectively, efficiently,
and economically.
Standard No.11: Expenditure Control. Adequate control
over expenditures requires that effective procedures be
devised to provide assurance that needed goods and
services are acquired at the lowest possible cost; that
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goods and services paid for are actually received; that
quality, quantity, and prices are in accordance with
the applicable contracts or other authorization; that
such authorizations are consistent with applicable
statutes, regulations, and policies; and that effective
use is made of all acquired resources.
Standard No.8: Accuracy. Reliability, and Materiality.
In determining the degree of precision to be sought in
making allocations of cost (expense) or revenue or in
computing other items where judgments and estimates are
employed, the materiality and relative significance of
the items involved should be considered carefully.
Meticulous procedures which do not produce materially
more accurate results or provide other off-setting
benefits should be avoided.
The Schick typology and these standards appear to lend
themselves to a study of behavioral issues within the
governmental sector, especially within governmental
budgeting.
ERVIN
Ervin [1980] surveyed 385 chief budget administrators
of 252 Illinois municipalities, which had populations of at
least 100,000.

Ervin elicited the administrators'

perceptions of the functions served by their particular
municipal budgeting system.

The officials were asked to

respond to 51 Likert-type items derived from Schick's essay
[1966], which were then factor analyzed.
Figure 2.1 shows the three factors hypothesized from
Schick's typology.

Only the five highest factor-loading

items which Ervin used to interpret the three factors are
included in the abstraction from Ervin's table of factor
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FIGURE 2.1
Ervin's [1980] Loading on Schick's Constructs of Budgeting
Hypothesized Control Indicators
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Comparison of current expenditure estimates with
actual expenditures of previous years
Accurate estimation of revenues
The work of the finance office in assuring monies
are spent appropriately
Conformance with the legal fiscal requirements of
the state
Inclusion of self-supporting funds in the budget
of appropriations ordinance

Hypothesized Management Indicators
1.
2.
3.
45.

Establishment of work standards
Scheduling and control of work
Recruitment of well-trained analysts and
technicians
Work measurement
Development of efficient work methods

Hypothesized Planning Indicators
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Discussion and development of community goals
Evaluation of ongoing services and programs
Efforts to match future resources with future
needs
Review of long-range plans
Anticipation of future events that might effect
community finances

loadings (Figure 2.1).^

^Ervin used ten additional items to interpret the three
factors. Together, the 25 items accounted for 86% of the
total variance. Additional factors did not have high enough
loadings to allow for interpretation of the underlying
dimensions.
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A review of Figure 2.1 indicates that while the three
constructs hypothesized by Schick are, indeed, present in
the orientations, practices, and activities of municipal
budgeting, the management and planning constructs are not as
representative of Schick's constructs.

Ervin [p.126]

suggests more accurate characterizations of the management
and planning constructs to be "management-analysis"
(concerned with day-to-day analyses and problem-solving) and
"planning-futures" (concerned with futuristic projections
and goals).

Ervin [p.121] concludes that:

there is a need for budgetary concepts and theory that
are more generic in nature, allowing a framework for
description and comparison independent of the emergence
and demise of particular techniques and approaches.
Schick's typology of budget functions is such a theory
and deserves continued testing, elaboration, and
refinement.
FREEMAN, NEIMI AND WILSON
The authors [1983] present a guide for local officials
in the evaluation of public expenditures.

Freeman et al.

state that local officials should not restrict their
concerns to budgetary effects of public programs, but should
also consider other important effects which may influence
the community's perception of the programs.

Figure 2.2

presents an illustration of the authors' steps in the
analysis of public programs.
Although the valuable time of skilled personnel is
required.

Freeman et al. suggest the use of in-house
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analysts for program analysis of local government operations
as being more efficient and effective than use of
FIGURE 2.2
Steps for Analyzing Public Programs
(from Freeman, Niemi, and Wilson, 1983)
DEFINE SITUATION1
IDENTIFY, MEASURE AND
VALUE PROGRAM'S COSTS

IDENTIFY, MEASURE AND
VALUE PROGRAM'S BENEFITS

DISCOUNT COSTS AND BENEFITS
ASSESS EQUITY IMPACTS
INTERPRET RESULTS OF
PROGRAM ANALYSIS

consultants.

They suggest that studies performed in-house

be considered investments in the knowledge and skill of
personnel.

Their views support maintaining the budgeting

function within local governmental units and emphasize the
need to understand its weaknesses.

An identification and

understanding of such weaknesses should lead toward
improvement in the resource allocation process as well as
greater security for employees of the governmental unit.
Freeman et al. [p.104] present a checklist for local
officials to determine whether a program has been adequately
analyzed.

The checklist is presented in Figure 2.3, below.

The importance of answering such questions cannot be denied;
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however, the degree of guidance offered by such a checklist
is questionable.

Admittedly, a checklist of detailed and

situation-specific items would prove impractical for all
local governmental budgeting needs, but the items mentioned
in Figure 2.3 appear to be extremely vague.

FIGURE 2.3
Analysis Review Checklist
(from Freeman, Neimi, and Wilson, 1983)
1.

Have the program's objectives been clearly and
completely stated?

2.

Has the population affected by the program and
relevant to the analysis be identified?

3.

Have the program's costs been estimated correctly?
Have any (budget or nonbudget) costs been over
looked or overweighted?

4.

Have the program's benefits been estimated correctly?
Have all of the benefits been identified,
correctly counted and weighted?

5.

Has the time value of money been accounted for by
discounting (with an appropriate discount rate) those
future costs and benefits for which dollar values can
be determined?

6.

Have the program's distributional impacts been
considered?

7.

Have the findings of the analysis been tested for
their sensitivity to changes in assumptions about the
magnitude of important costs or benefits?

GEORGE
George [1974] addressed the concept of "decision
stress" in decision making situations such as those facing
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persons responsible for formulating the budget of a
governmental unit.

Such persons must assess the expected

utility of a variety of alternative courses of action.

As

mentioned in chapter one, those assessments are not made in
isolation, but under the scrutiny of a multitude of parties
concerned with their own interests.
George recognizes cognitive limits on rational choice,
and explains that several intellectual difficulties
undermine legitimate efforts of rational calculation within
a political environment such as budgeting.

According to

George [p.180]:
1.

The political decision maker often must operate
with incomplete, possibly erroneous, information
about the situation at hand.

2.

His knowledge of ends-means relationships is
generally inadequate to enable him to predict with
confidence the consequences of choosing one or
another course of action.

3.

It is often difficult for him to formulate a
single criterion of value by virtue of which to
choose the "best" of alternative options.

The research efforts referred to above highlight the
need for an understanding of the decision making process in
situations where judgment plays a significant role in
determining an outcome.

As described above, the budgeting

process places the governmental manager in such a
situation.
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EADIE AND STEINBACHER
In their recent work with the Ohio Bureau of Employment
Services, Eadie and Steinbacher [1985, p.430] propose
strategic agenda management as a combination of
organizational development efforts with strategic planning
techniques.
are " . . .

However, they state that planning techniques
subordinate to the human process of painful, time

consuming decision making based on the best available
information (emphasis in original)."

Furthermore, they

believe that as human capabilities increase, the strength of
formal planning mechanics used increases.

Their

observations and recommendations regarding the planning
process are presented in a vague conceptual manner, much
like George [1974] above.
Reviews of Studies at the Local Level
CORNIA AND USHER
Cornia and Usher [1981] have found the majority of
budgeting literature to focus on federal and state levels of
government-

Lack of attention to local budgeting in the

literature contributes to the extension of federal and state
level research findings to local governments as well.
However, the authors present several reasons why such an
extension may not be warranted;
1. Constraints placed on the budget officer are
different at the federal, state and local levels (e.g.,
federal is not required to submit a balanced budget);
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2. Revenue sources at the local level are less
responsive to economic change; and
3. Elected officials (e.g., President or Governor) may
play a different role in the budget process than an
appointed official (e.g., city manager).
The authors have noted that most of the few published
works on local budgeting have used a case study approach or
a very limited sample of cities.

For example, Crecine

[1967] focused on Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Cleveland in his
development of a computer simulation of the budgeting
process.

One of the major conclusions of Crecine*s work was

that increases in external revenue sources leads to
increased budget requests.

He found the mayor's or city

manager's budget letter to influence budget preparation.
Furthermore, Crecine suggested that pre-structured budget
forms may play an important role in determining expenditure
policy.

Meltzner [1971] is another example of a case study.

Meltzner researched the budgeting process of Oakland,
California, as a participant observer.

He found that

especially during the final stages of balancing the budget,
fiscal control, rather than the expected outcome of proposed
expenditures, was the main concern.
Cornia and Usher have found that budgeting studies tend
to emphasize the results of the budgeting process, ignoring
the decision-making process.

In their review of the budget

preparation manuals of 86 cities with populations of at
least 100,000 in 1975, Cornia and Usher [p.89] concluded:
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It seems that municipal budgeting has progressed from a
tedium item-by-item examination of proposed
expenditures to a more complex decision-making
process. While the former process was implicitly
incremental, the latter is explicitly incremental as a
result of the translation of the base concept and
disjointed incrementalism into practical modes of
budgetary analysis. The result in either case may be
incrementalism, but municipal budget decisions may now
be more "rational"
at least at the margin!
HONADLE
Honadle [1983] provides a guide to the literature on
public administration in rural and small jurisdictions for
the period 1960 through 1981.

Her review was partially in

response to the perceived neglect of nonmetropolitan and
small governments in the United States despite the fact that
a majority of Americans are served by such governmental
units.

Honadle [p. xvi] cites, "Consider Public

Administration Review, the leading journal in the field.
Except for one special symposium in 1980, PAR has paid
almost no attention to the special problems of rural public
administration."

Regarding the capital budgeting issue,

Honadle found a single study conducted in 1973, on a rural
community of approximately 20,000 people.
The literature review includes approximately 20
journals, dissertation abstracts, government documents,
computerized literature searches of three databases, and
selected reports.

As a result of the extensive review,

Honadle concludes that there is a public administration
literature focusing on rural areas and smaller
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jurisdictions.

Not only are there distinctions to be

recognized between larger, urban jurisdictions and smaller,
rural jurisdictions, but there are distinctions to be
recognized among the smaller, rural governments.

Honadle

[p. xxi] states that, "Perhaps the most crucial finding is
that one should not overgeneralize about 'the rural
community' or 'the small town.'"

Although not universally

applicable across all such jurisdictions, several common
characteristics were identified.

Some of Honadle's findings

are presented by headings below:
Population Density.

Urban areas, generally, have

higher concentrations of people than rural areas.

This

state allows urban areas to provide both general and
specialized services to its inhabitants, whereas rural areas
are limited to the provision of general services which are
required by the majority of its people.

There appears to be

an inverse relationship between population density of a
jurisdiction and cost of services provided.

A direct

relationship seems evident between population density and
service quality and availability.
Lack of Expertise and Human Resources.

This situation

is seen as being directly tied to the lack of fiscal
resources of rural jurisdictions and training opportunities
for rural personnel.

This common characteristic has

significant implications for rural governments.
Understaffing and inadequate job performance generally
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contribute to a low quality and quantity of services
provided by rural units as well as neglect of most (if not
all) long-range planning.

Many jurisdictions have been

found to use personnel in multiple roles and/or employ a
shared or "circuit riding" manager in attempts to lessen the
squeeze of tight fiscal constraints.
Resistance to Innovation.

There appears to be a

resistance to innovation among rural citizens and agencies.
Cited reasons for such attitudes include perceived excessive
costs, ineffectiveness, and views that governmental units
are not as capable of providing the innovative services as
are individuals and private enterprise.

Honadle and others

suggest the need to show quick results as well as the merit
of innovation in order to lessen such resistance.
STALLINGS AND FERRIS
Stallings and Ferris [1988] provide an analysis of
actual data for five-year intervals on characteristics of
research reported in Public Administration Review (PAR).
The review covers the 45 year period from 1940 through 1984.
The authors chose to focus on PAR because it is ". . . the
official journal of the main professional organization, it
is most representative of research of general interest to
the field over a long time period."
A random sample of 176 articles from the period 1940
through 1974 was taken and the title, abstract,
acknowledgements, section headings, and all tables and
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figures were examined.

The entire text was read only when

the initial screening was inadequate for coding.

Stallings

and Ferris added their review of 176 articles to 289
articles from the period 1975 through 1984 reviewed by Perry
and Kraemer [1986].

One of the major interests during the

review was any trend in research attention across federal,
state, and local levels of government.

Stallings and Ferris

note that local government studies have never been a major
research focus.

Table 2.1 shows that local government

research has always represented less than one-fourth of the
published work in PAR.
The conclusions drawn from their review include
Stallings' and Ferris' belief that characteristics of recent
work in PAR differ very little from published work of nearly
fifty years prior.

According to Stallings and Ferris

[p.583]:
Research is still dominated by efforts to
conceptualize researchable problems, delineate
possible areas of inquiry, and describe objects for
study. Little causal analysis or theory testing has
taken place over the years, and causal analyses, while
significantly more frequent now than in previous
decades, comprise only a small proportion of current
research.
While Stallings and Ferris believe PAR provides a good
indication of the profession's views of research, they offer
three reasons why article-length research may be
underrepresented in PAR:
1.
2.

Researchers may submit elsewhere,
PAR editors may be opposed to publishing results of
individual research efforts, and

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

43
3.

The peer review process may eliminate a majority of
submitted research efforts due to questionably
sound methodology.

Furthermore, the authors believe that public administration
has been clinging to its practitioner focus too long.

They

suggest that fundamental questions must be asked about the
nature of the public sector and its relationships with
society in order to bring about new directions in public
administration research.

TABLE 2.1
Local Level of Government Emphasized in Articles
in the Public Administration Review. 1940-1984
(from Stallings and Ferris, 1988)
Interval
1940-44
1945-49
1950-54
1955-59
1960—64
1965-69
1970-74
1975-79
1980-84
df
P
Cramer's V

Percent of
Articles
5.3
0.0
5.3
9.1
20.0
23.2
22.2
*
*

Number of
Articles
1
0
1
2
4
7
10

11.41
6
0.08
0.20

*Due to the type of coding technique used by
Perry and Kraemer [1986] (authors reviewing this
time interval), these values are too small to
report.
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Empirical Capital Budgeting Research at the Local Level
SOKOLOW AND HONADLE
Based on available studies, Sokolow and Honadle [1984,
p.373] state that a "centralized executive budget is widely
viewed as the predominant form of local government budgeting
in the United S t a t e s . H o w e v e r , the authors noted that the
studies, almost exclusively, focused on larger local
governmental units.

Moreover, the few studies to be found

on smaller governmental unit practices " . . .

offer the

obvious generalization that expertise and professionalism
are in short supply."
Sokolow and Honadle use a case study approach to
investigate the annual budgeting process of small and rural
governments.

Their work is an addition to the literature as

a result of their definition of "small" government.3
Sokolow and Honadle believe that units with populations of
50,000 or more (the lower limit for most small government
research) may not be comparable to units of much smaller
size.

Thus, they examine the practices of eight

^The authors refer to the following works; Thomas J.
Anton, Budgeting in Three Illinois Cities (Urbana, IL:
Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of
Illinois, 1964); J. Richard Aronson and Eli Schwartz (eds.),
Management Policies in Local Government Finance (Washington,
D.C.: International City Management Association, 1975) ch.4;
and Lewis Friedman, Budgeting Municipal Expenditures: A
Studv in Comparative Policv Making (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1975).
^The MFOA defines "small" as governments serving less
than 100,000.
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municipalities (with populations between 1,600 and 4,000)
and four counties (with populations between 11,000 and
21,000).

All twelve governments were located in Illinois or

California.
The authors used a simplified version of the executive
budgeting process (see Figure 2.4) in reviewing the
budgeting process of the twelve governments.

They noted

only three of the stages shown in Figure 2.4 in all twelve
governments;

compilation (stage 4), approval (stage 7), and

execution (stage 8) .

Four major deviations from the

executive process were noted and are described below.
Executive Policv.

The most formal governments provided

guidance (procedural steps) by establishing calendars and
standard worksheets, but only a few of the governments had
administrators who offered advice and suggestions at the
outset.

Sokolow and Honadle did not consider those

administrators as providing executive policy because they
did not control later action.
Department Proposals.

This aspect ranged from

elaborate proposals accompanied by background material to
simple statements with a few figures typed on a single
paper.

At this stage, much was based on the clerks'

personal knowledge, estimates and informal consultations
with others.
Revenue Estimates.

This stage varied widely in the

amount of attention it received during the budgeting
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FIGURE 2.4
Simplified Executive Budget Process
(from Solokow and Honadle, 1984)

Executive sets budget policy for departments,
coordinates later steps

Departments prepare spending requests

Finance staff prepares revenue estimates, etc.

Executive compiles requests, other information

Executive reviews material, reconciles
expenditures and revenues, revises into
a new document

Executive presents document as his budget
with budget message

Legislature reviews, revises, approves

Executive executes

process.

The California governments emphasized this stage

and the importance of such information.

The authors feel

this was a result of tax-cutting activism (e.g.. Proposition
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13) in that state.

In contrast to the California

governments, the Illinois governments gave the revenue
estimation stage far less attention.

Many municipalities

did not even require this information.
Executive Review and Recommendations.

Sokolow and

Honadle found this to be the area where the executive budget
model was most violated by the twelve governments under
study.

They found the following condition [p.376]:

No budget in the 12 rural communities was presented to
the legislative body as a product of an executive's
priorities and revisions. In most cases the spending
proposals considered by the governing board were merely
collections of original departmental requests. No
executive "messages" were forwarded along with the
budget or appropriations documents. Entirely absent in
the process was the extensive analysis, review, and
revision considered to be the responsibility of a
strong manager or other official in an executive budget
process. Some administrative manipulation or revision
of spending requests and other information did occur
before legislative review. City clerks, county
auditors, and other officials who compiled
departmental requests or drafted appropriation
ordinances were in a position to suggest or actually
make changes.
As described above, the executive budget process was
not as extensive as the model (Figure 2.4).

Consequently,

legislative actions played a much larger part in the budget
process.

Because of the lack of executive-originated

recommendations regarding expenditure priorities, etc., the
majority of the budget deliberations were conducted by the
city council and county boards of supervisors.

In one city,

advisory commissions (one council member and several
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citizens appointed by the council) consulted with department
heads in the request for funds.
Sokolow and Honadle found that a single official
sometimes dominated the entire budget process by not only
controlling the procedural work but also exercising
influence over others involved in the process.

The

influence was found to be both formal and informal in
nature.

Because the city clerks were the only full-time

generalist officials for their communities, they were often
the central figures in preparation of the budget.

For

example, consider the difference between the roles of the
following two clerks studied by the authors [p.379-380];
In the first city the clerk estimated revenues,
compiled expenditure requests from other officials, and
prepared all budget materials for the council. She
served also as the principal supplier of factual
information (comparisons with past expenditures, state
legisls ive developments, and so on) to the council
during its budget deliberations.
The clerk in the second city, by contrast, did not
hesitate to offer opinions and intervene in other parts
of the process, in addition to coordinating and
compiling the budget. Her influence was exercised in
two ways— by aggressively advising department heads
about the contents of their proposals and the
strategies of dealing with the council, and by offering
suggestions to individual legislators or to the entire
council at their budget sessions.
In conclusion of their field research, the authors feel
many improvements are possible regarding budgetary
procedures of small governments (populations well under
50,000).

As Sokolow and Honadle [p.382] state:

Certainly this cannot be accomplished with lasting
effect by giving small governments advice and
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techniques that require full-time chief executives with
finance staffs to implement fully. . . A more
meaningful approach to the improvement of budgetary
practices in rural local governments is to work with
existing resources and arrangements— to offer advice
and training to elected administrators and members of
legislative bodies that is consistent with their
multiple responsibilities and time limitations.
KEE, ROBBINS AND APOSTOLOU
In an attempt to fill the void in the literature
regarding

any assessment of the current budgeting practices

of municipal governments, Kee et al. [1987] surveyed 200
municipal finance officers of cities having populations of
50,000 or more.

The officers were randomly selected from

the Directory: Municipal Officers of U.S. Cities, and a
response rate of 49% was achieved.
Figure 2.5 provides a profile of the respondents.

It

is interesting to note that 26% had only baccalaureate
degrees and 5% had no formal education at all.

It is also

interesting to see that 58% of the respondents majored in
accounting and finance, but preferred capital budgeting
techniques less sophisticated than the net present value
(NPV) or internal rate of return (IRR) techniques, which are
considered optimal in finance literature.

In asking why NPV

or IRR were not used, the authors found the two most
frequent responses to be (1) the inability to incorporate
qualitative aspects, and (2) political factors.

Both of

these reasons may allow for a capital budgeting process
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FIGURE 2.5
Characteristics of Respondents to the
Kee, et al., [1987] Survey of Municipal Finance Officers
FORMAL EDUCATION:
Highest Level of Study
Undergraduate
Graduate
Other
TOTAL

Number
24
63

Percent
26
69
5

92

100

ACADEMIC SPECIALIZATION:
Area
Accounting
Public Administration
Other
TOTAL

Number
35
17
29
81

Percent
43
21
36
100

Number

Percent

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:
Governmental Financial Affairs
Less than 1 year
1 to 4 years
5 to 9 years
Over 10 years
TOTAL

1
17
22
55
95

1
18
23
58
100

Budgeting Capital Projects

Number

Perc(

Less than 1 year
1 to 4 years
5 to 9 years
Over 10 years
TOTAL

4
30
19
42
95

4
32
20
44
100

Questionnaires with blank responses were not included in
the number (percent) responding to the Kee, et al., survey.
Consequently, the total responses for certain questions may
be less than 97.
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which may be influenced by the presentation or discussion
of issues (i.e., framing).
One other aspect of the Kee et al. study which may
create an environment best tested with prospect theory is
the analysis of risk.

Seventy-nine percent of the

respondents claimed risk to be a primary concern in capital
budgeting.

Surprisingly, 39% of the respondents rely solely

on nonquantitative procedures for analyzing risk.

Thus,

perhaps due to the significant role political and social
considerations play in municipal asset selection, risk
analysis by many municipal managers (of cities with
populations greater than 50,000) is "highly subjective and
unsophisticated."
that " . . .

Consequently, Kee et al. [p.22] conclude

considerable room exists for improving municipal

capital budgeting decisions."
Introduction and Development of Prospect Theory
As mentioned in chapter one, most of the literature
through the 1970s which focused on decision making under
risk relied on expected utility theory.

John von Newmann

and Oskar Horgenstern [1944] developed the theory as a
formal decision criterion which served two important
purposes:

(i) it provided an axiomatic basis for a theory

of decision making under uncertainty and (2) it incorporated
attitudes toward risk in the utility function.

Expected

utility theory was developed to suggest how individuals
should behave under conditions of uncertainty (i.e..
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normative).

However, researchers have relied on expected

utility theory as an accurate predictive model of how people
will act.

Among the arguments for the use of utility theory

in normative analysis is the fact that optimal decisions
increase the chances for survival among competitors.
One of the axioms of expected utility theory is
transitivity.

The theory holds that decision makers

identify all possible states of the environment as well as
the outcomes associated with each state.

Once the

identification is accomplished, individuals' preferences are
assumed to be transitive over the set of outcomes.

That is,

if an individual chooses outcome #1 over outcome #2 and
outcome #2 over outcome #3, then the individual must choose
outcome #1 over outcome #3.
Moreover, expected utility theory requires decision
makers to not only choose the appropriate probabilities for
each of the possible

states of a decision,

butto apply the

rules of probability

theory in determining

theprobability

of compound events as well.

For example, a basic law of

probability, the extension rule, states that if A contains
B, then P(A) > P(B).
1974, 1982 and 1986]

Kahneman and Tversky

[K&T, 1979; T&K,

note that decision makers often violate

such rules of probability and requirements of expected
utility theory.

A part of their argument is based on the

use of heuristics, which is not the focus of the current
study.

However, much of their argument is presented in
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terms of prospect theory.

Thus, the fundamentals of their

theory are discussed below.
KAHNEMAN AND TVERSKY
In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky published a critique of
expected utility theory and presented their alternative
model of decision making under risk, prospect theory.

They

found two significant behaviors to be present in choices
among risky prospects:
isolation effect.

(1) certainty effect and (2)

The two stage decision process assumed by

prospect theory and the way they relate to the certainty and
isolation effects are discussed below.
Certaintv Effect.

This term is used to describe the

overweighting of outcomes that are guaranteed (or viewed as
certain), relative to outcomes viewed as less than certain
(or probable).

Kahneman and Tversky [p.265] use a variation

of Allais' [1953] counter-example to expected utility theory
as a very simple illustration of the use of their term:
Choose between
A:

2,500 with probability 0.33
2,400 with probability 0.66
0 with probability 0.Ô1

B:

2,400 with
certainty

Only 18% chose A, which has the higher expected utility.
Isolation Effect.

Kahneman and Tversky note that

decision makers often simplify their task by ignoring
elements that all of the alternatives have in common.

The

problem with such behavior is that the alternatives can be
decomposed in common and uncommon elements in numerous ways,
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leading to different preferences.

The authors [p.271] make

their point with the following problem:
Consider the following 2-stage game. In the first
stage, there is a probability of 0.75 to end the game
without winning anything, and a probability of 0.25 to
move into the second stage. If you reach the second
stage, you have a choice between
(4,000, 0.80)

and

(3000)

Your choice must be made before the game starts, i.e.,
before the outcome of the first stage is known.
In terms of the final outcomes, the choices are (4,000,
0.20) and (3,000, 0.25) due to the 25% chance of getting to
stage two.
Figure 2.6 shows how decomposition of the problem may
lead to different decisions.

The standard formulation shows

the appropriate composition of the two-stage game.

The 25%

chance of reaching stage 2 is incorporated into the
alternatives available at stage 2.

For example, there is a

25% chance of reaching stage 2 and if reached there is an
80% chance to obtain 4000.
chance to obtain 4000.

Thus, there is a (80% x 25%) 20%

This is a notable contrast to the

perceived 80% chance for 4000 when a sequential process is
applied.

By processing the stages of the game in sequence,

the 25% chance of reaching stage two is ignored in the
consideration of choices available once stage two is reached
because both alternatives of stage 2 depend on reaching
stage 2.

In other words, the alternatives at stage 2 are

evaluated as if stage 2 exists in isolation of stage one.
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FIGURE 2.6
Sequential and Standard Formulation
for Problem Evaluation

3000

4000

(standard formulation)
3000
4000

0

0
(sequential formulation)

FIGURE 2.7
Editing Operations of Prospect Theory
(from Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)
Coding -

outcomes may be coded as gains or losses in
relation to the reference point;
Combination - probabilities associated with identical
outcomes may be combined;
Segregation - riskless components of a prospect are set
apart;
Cancellation - components shared by prospects may be
discarded;
Simplification - probabilities and outcomes are rounded;
Dominance - clearly dominated prospects are discarded.
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Thus, the sequential formulation has a certainty advantage
associated with the 3,000.

Kahneman and Tversky note that

The reversal of preferences due to the dependency among
events is particularly significant because it violated the
basic supposition of a decision-theoretical analysis, that
choice between prospects is determined solely by the
probabilities of final states.
The same behavior was found regarding representations
of outcomes rather than probabilities.

When given 1000 and

a choice between a sure 500 or a 50% chance for 1000, 84% of
the subjects chose the sure 500.

However, when given 2000

and a choice between a sure reduction of 500 or a 50% chance
of a reduction of 1000, 69% of the subjects chose the
gamble.

The two problems have identical final states.

The Phases.

The departures from expected utility

theory (like those presented above) are addressed by
Kahneman and Tversky's explanation of the decision making
process.

There are two stages in the choice process,

according to prospect theory:

editing and evaluation.

Editing is the process of simplifying the task of choosing
among alternatives of uncertainty (see Figure 2.7 for a list
of editing operations).

Evaluation is the process of

comparing edited prospects and choosing the one with the
highest value.

Prospect theory assumes that editing

operations are not mutually exclusive and are performed
whenever possible.

Furthermore, Kahneman and Tversky
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[p.275] state, ” . . .

the preference order between prospects

need not be invariant across contexts, because the same
offered prospect could be edited in different ways depending
on the context in which it appears.4”
The evaluation phase can be explained in terms of the
modifications to the underlying general linear form of
expected utility theory.
values attach to changes.

Prospect theory assumes that
In contrast, expected utility

theory assumes values attach to final states.

The effect of

these different assumptions can at least partially be seen
in Figure 2.6 (sequential and standard processes).

Prospect

theory also departs from expected utility theory by assuming
that decision weights are not equal to stated probabilities.
The value function and decision weights of prospect theory
are described below.
The Value Function.

Kahneman and Tversky claim that an

essential aspect of prospect theory is the idea that changes
in wealth or welfare, rather than final states, carry value.
They state [p.277], "Our perceptual apparatus is attuned to
the evaluation of changes or differences rather than to the
evaluation of absolute magnitudes."

The evaluation of

change is dependent on the reference point (initial
position), which is typically status quo.^

Prospect theory.

^This refers to the "context effect" or framing.
^The reference point can also be an adaptation level,
expected future wealth position, or targeted return level
[Fishburn, 1977; Payne et al., 1980].
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then, assumes the value function for changes to be concave
above the reference point, but convex below (see Figure
2.8).

In other words, "the marginal value of both gains and

losses generally decreases with their magnitude [K&T,
p.278]."

However, based on attitudes regarding changes in

wealth, the value function reflects the notion that the
pleasure of gaining an amount of money is not as great as
the displeasure of losing the same amount.

Thus, the S-

shaped value function of Figure 2.8 depicts the "reflection
effect" which implies risk aversion in potential gain
situations and risk seeking in potential loss situations.
Decision Weights.

Prospect theory requires that the

value of each outcome be multiplied by a decision weight.
Thus, it is important to understand the nature of decision
weights, as introduced by Fellner [1961].

They are not

simply the perceived likelihood of events, rather they are
measures of the affect events have on the desirability of
the outcome.

It is important to understand that decision

weights do not measure degree or belief, nor do they follow
the axioms of probability.
related to probabilities.

However, decision weights can be
Identified properties are

illustrated in Figure 2.9 and are listed below:®
1. "d" (subjective decision weight associated with the
probability) is an increasing function of "p"
(probability of prospect occurring) with d(0) = 0 and
d(l) = 1 ; impossible events are ignored and the
®See Sanders [1986, pp. 35-36] and Kahneman and Tversky
[1979].
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FIGURE 2.8
S-shaped Value Function of Prospect Theory
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Weighting Function of Prospect Theory

0 .5

0

0 .5

1.0

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

60
normalized scale reflects unity for certain events.
Individuals' difficulty in cognisizing extreme
probabilities results in highly unlikely events being
edited as impossible outcomes and extremely likely
events being edited as certain outcomes. Such editing
produces discontinuities of "d" toward the endpoints of
the 0 to 1 interval.
2. Decision makers tend to overweight low
probabilities, (d(p)>p), while tending to underweight
moderate to high probabilities, (d(p)<p).
3. The sum of complementary decision weights is less
than one [d(p)+d(p-l)<l for 0<p<l] due to the
underweighting effect being more pronounced than the
overweighting. Because of this "subcertainty effect,"
preferences are generally less sensitive to probability
variations than the expectation principle would
suggest.
4. A "subadditivity effect" occurs only for small
probabilities, and low probabilities are not accurately
differentiated. The decision maker assigns decision
weights, which diminish the comparative differences
between probabilities, to low probabilities. Then, the
decision makers will emphasize the comparative
magnitudes of the outcomes [d(rp)>rd(p) for 0<r<l].
5. For a fixed probability ratio, the ratio of the
associated decision weights "d" are closer to one when
the probabilities are low than when they are high
[d(pq)/d(p)<d(pqr)/d(pr) for 0<p,q,r<l]. For example,
the ratio of "d" in d(.l)/d(.3) is closer to one than
the ratio of "d" in d(.3)/d(.9). This "subpro
portionality" effect holds only if the log of "d" is a
convex function of the log of "p".
6. In 1953, Allais first introduced the "certainty
effect," where outcomes that are certain loom larger
than those which are merely probable. That is,
certainty prospects are overweighted relative to
probable ones. Reducing the probabilities of a
prospect by a constant factor will have more impact on
the preference ordering when the outcomes are initially
certain than when they are merely probable.
7. The slope of "d" can be interpreted as measuring
the sensitivity of preference to changes in
probabilities.
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TVERSKY AND KAHNEMAN
In their 1986 publication, Tversky & Kahneman (T&K)
explicitly address four of the major assumptions of expected
utility theory and illustrate that decision makers
frequently violate the assumptions.

As a result of their

research, T&K conclude that normative and descriptive
analyses of decision making cannot be reconciled.
T&K address the assumptions of cancellation,
transitivity, dominance, and invariance.

The assumption of

cancellation, which is widely challenged, is required to
represent preferences between prospects as the maximization
of expected utility.

According to T&K [p. S252]:

The main argument for cancellation is that only one
state will actually be realized, which makes it
reasonable to evaluate the outcomes of options
separately for each state. The choice between options
should therefore depend only on states in which they
yield different outcomes.
T&K find the empirical validity of this assumption to be
dependent on framing.
The assumption of transitivity, mentioned earlier, is
satisfied if each option can be assigned a value which is
independent of other available options.
been found to affect this assumption.

Again, framing has
T&K see dominance as

one of the more obvious principles of rational choice.
Dominance requires that the preferred option be the one
which is at least as good as all other options in all states
and better than all options in one state.

Invariance is the

fourth assumption, and has been widely accepted for its
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normative appeal.

This assumption requires that the

preference between options is not dependent on their
descriptions.
"...

Their observations suggest that people do not

spontaneously aggregate concurrent prospects or

transform all outcomes into a common frame," and thus
violate the assumption of invariance.

T&K [p.S254] state

that "Because invariance and dominance are normatively
essential and descriptively invalid, a theory of rational
decision behavior cannot provide an adequate description of
choice behavior."

Another point of difference between

expected utility and prospect theory is found in T&K's
discussion of the effects of framing outcomes.

They have

found that people are more sensitive to changes in wealth
(prospect theory's preferences for gains and losses) than
states of wealth (as implied by expected utility theory).
That is, people tend to have a risk-averse preference for
equal states of wealth framed as gains and risk-seeking
preference for equal states of wealth framed as losses.

A

potentially significant implication of this finding for the
current study is the following [p. S261]:
. . . a difference that favors outcome A over outcome B
can sometimes be framed either as an advantage of A or
as a disadvantage of B by suggesting either B or A as
the neutral reference point. Because of loss aversion,
the difference will loom larger when A is neutral and
B-A is evaluated as a loss than when B is neutral and
A-B is evaluated as a gain. The significance of such
variations of framing has been noted in several
contexts. . . Framing the consequences of a public
policy in positive or in negative terms can greatly
alter its appeal.
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T&K present one of the major findings of their study to
be that people tend to violate the axioms of rational choice
when the situations are nontransparent.

Furthermore, they

conclude the normative analysis of choice should be separate
from the descriptive.
Readers familiar with budgeting literature in public
administration and political science might also be familiar
with the incremental theory of budgeting.?

Incrementalism,

much like prospect theory, resulted from recognition of
weaknesses associated with rational decision makers.

It is

important to note that the use of prospect theory in this
work is not considered a competing theory in the explanation
of budgetary decision making.

Rather, it is believed that,

if combined, the theories might provide a more complete
explanation.

Future research should address such a combined

approach.
Research Emplovina Prospect Theory
Since Kahneman and Tversky first introduced their
concepts of prospect theory in 1979, several research
efforts have been conducted which lend support to this
theory of decision making behavior under uncertainty.

A few

of the more recent of such works are briefly discussed
below.

?See Wildavsky [1964 & 1979] for more detail regarding
the incremental theories of the budgetary process.
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KNOX
Knox [1987] compared the capabilities of the prospect
theory model and the expected utility theory model in
accommodating observed behavior of decision making under
uncertainty.

She employed two scenarios of uncertainty —

illegal returns and plea bargaining —
criminals as subjects.

using 70 convicted

She found prospect theory to provide

a more appropriate model of decision making under
uncertainty than expected utility theory.

Knox shows the

appropriateness of prospect theory to stem from the theory's
allowing probabilities to be transformed.
PUTO
Puto [1985] modelled the reference point of industrial
buyers.

He used 372 industrial buyers in a controlled

experiment, and found that industrial buyers' choices
conform to patterns predicted by prospect theory.

A higher

proportion of subjects who framed choices as gains preferred
the riskless alternative over the gamble than did subjects
who framed choices as losses.

Based on his findings, Puto

suggests methods of increasing effectiveness of marketing
managers' sales and marketing communication efforts.
CHANG
Chang [1984] investigated the taxpayer's inclination to
play the tax audit lottery, assuming the decision to be a
choice problem under uncertainty.

The experiment used 81
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students enrolled in an executive MBA program, and found the
prospect theory model to be descriptive of the subjects'
choices under uncertainty in the tax audit setting.

As

predicted by prospect theory, underwithheld taxpayers were
more inclined to play the lottery than overwithheld
taxpayers and taxpayers were very sensitive to changes in
the probability of successful avoidance.
SANDERS
Sanders [1986] used tax practitioners from a national
CPA firm to test four specific hypotheses based on prospect
theory;
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Subjects' decision choices will differ for
decisions framed as gains from those framed as
losses;
Reducing the probability of a certain and probable
prospect by a constant factor will affect
subjects' decision choices;
Subjects' decision choices will be similar for
individual and concurrent decisions; and
A concurrent and a combined decision frame will
evoke different decision choices.

The task involved reviewing two scenarios of tax issues
affecting the

"client's" current tax return, and suggesting

to the client an appropriate tax treatment for each of the
issues.

Sanders found support for the choice preferences

for gains versus losses and found that responses differed,
as expected, for scenarios framed with certainty rather than
probability.

However, Sanders did not find support that

individuals are risk averse in gain situations and risk
seeking in loss situations.

This may suggest the need to
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present framed scenarios in a way that puts the decision
maker at risk more directly in order to more effectively
test this assumption of prospect theory.
CROSBY, MOSKOWITZ, AND MAHESH
This study appears to have a finding similar to one
found by Sanders [1986], above.

Crosby et al. [1986], used

14 practicing auditors (7 seniors and 7 partners) from seven
Big-8 firms in their examination of the degree of individual
differences in auditor behavior as suggested by differences
in utility functions.

The auditors were asked to act in

their capacity as auditors rather than their capacity as
individuals managing their own personal funds.

The task

involved stating the dollar amount of a certain sum which
would leave the auditor indifferent between a 50-50 gamble
and their stated certainty amount.

The study does not

indicate whether the scenarios relate to client-related
uncertainty or audit firm-related uncertainty issues.
Crosby et al., did find all subjects to show a significant
shift in risk behavior over the entire region of the
function.

Most of the subjects were risk averse above their

target (or reference) point and risk seeking below.
However, seniors were found to be less risk-averse to losses
than partners.

As with Sanders [1986], this may be due to

the nature of the task and the subjects' role or
relationship to the scenarios employed.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

67
FIEGENBAUM AND THOMAS
Fiegenbaum and Thomas [1988] appear to be one of the
first to apply the concepts of prospect theory at the
organizational level.

Their study developed a research

methodology to determine whether prospect theory's concepts
regarding individuals' risk attitudes provide explanations
of risk behavior at the firm level.

The study used U. S.

industrial firms from COMPUSTAT from the period 1960 through
1979.

Each firm's average performance level was used as a

proxy for its reference point in the analysis of
relationships between risk and return both across firms and
within industries.

The study found strong support for the

assumptions of prospect theory when applied at the
organizational level.

Findings suggest "that most firms may

be risk seeking when they are suffering losses or are below
targeted aspiration levels (their reference point).
Conversely, they will tend to be risk averse following
achievement of aspirations and targets [p. 97]."
LEVIN, JOHNSON, DELDIN, CARSTENS,
CRESSY, AND DAVIS
This study focused on two issues.

First, Levin et al.

[1986] were concerned with isolating the locus of the
framing effect.

Second, they were interested in analyzing

framing effects under complete and incomplete information
for evidence of predictive ability regarding discrete
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choices.

The subjects'® behavior supported the basic

assumptions of prospect theory.

In addition, subjects in a

positive condition were more risk averse than subjects in a
negative condition when the gamble was missing probability
information.

As stated by Levin et al. [p.63]:

A parsimonious interpretation of the complete set of
results of this study . . . is that information frame
affects the relative scale values associated with the
likelihood of winning and losing . . . as shown in the
present study, the occurrence of framing effects when
probability information is alternatively expressed in
positive or negative terms can cause reversals of
preference between alternatives with complete and
incomplete information.
NORTHCRAFT AND NEALE
Northcraft and Neale [1986] used twenty undergraduate
business students assuming the role of investment advisors
in their analysis of the role of opportunity costs in
resource allocation decisions.

Their scenarios focused on

the issue of long-term resource allocation decisions meeting
with a setback which may lead to unanticipated unfavorable
long-term outcomes.

Northcraft and Neale found support for

prospect theory's descriptions of decision behavior when
framing options as gains and losses.

They also found that

inclusion of opportunity cost in the decision frames changes
the total gains and losses evaluated by the decision maker

®The study does not identify its subjects. It is
assumed that the study employed undergraduate psychology
students.
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and changes the preference.

Each of their research

hypotheses were confirmed:
(1)

(2)
(3)

opportunity costs were less likely than out-ofpocket costs to be considered in deciding whether
to abandon or continue a project experiencing a
setback;
by heightening the salience of opportunity costs,
persistence was viewed more negative an option and
abandonment more positive an option; and
by heightening the salience of opportunity costs,
there was a decrease in persistence in light of a
major setback.

BAZERMAN
In 1984, Bazerman applied Kahneman and Tversky's
concepts of framing to an organizational behavior setting.
He used framing to address three specific issues:

(1)

literature on the escalation of commitment to a previous
course of action; (2) concessionary behavior by negotiators;
and (3) the risky shift paradigm.

Bazerman argues that

currently accepted views on these issues must be
reconsidered.

More specifically, he concludes:

(1)

The frame used influences decision makers and its
impact must be separated from the impact of the
escalation paradigm's objective state;
(2) The paradoxical state of arbitration being a riskseeking alternative yet increasingly being
employed by risk-averse parties can be explained
by considering the positive (or at least neutral)
framing behavior of successful negotiators; and
(3) The Choice Dilemma Questionnaire used to
operationalize risk in risky shift research was
generally positively framed, leading to an entire
. body of biased research.

Bazerman believes that prospect theory is relevant to
even the most powerful of organizational behavior theories
as well as to an increased understanding of applied
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managerial problems.

In conclusion, he makes an important

observation concerning the fact that decision makers must
often frame the problems they face within their environment
because many actual problems are not already framed as
completely negative or positive.
BAZERMAN, MAGLIOZZI, AND NEALE
This 1985 study focused on the implications of prospect
theory in integrative bargaining and the free-market.

Using

Tversky and Kahneman's explanation of how people respond
differently to questions framed as losses versus questions
framed as gains, Bazerman et al. analyzed the behavior of
178 graduate and undergraduate students randomly assigned to
either positively or negatively framed buyer or seller
roles.

According to Bazerman et al. [p. 310]:

The results found that positively framed negotiators
completed significantly more transactions than
negatively framed negotiators. This result is
consistent with Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory
and contradicts the form of rationality suggested by
the utility theory. That is, negotiators with the same
objective information may compromise to very different
degrees depending on the frame (gain versus loss) in
which they view the transaction.
DECKER, SCHEPANSKI, AND SHIN
Decker et al. [1985] tested the prospect theory model,
along with three other models, of the principals'
information evaluation behavior in a private, pre-decision,
principal-agency setting.

The tests were "designed to

disconfirm the models' predictions without assuming initial
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conditions [p. 430]."

They found that the use of prospect

theory can be extended from its information evaluatordecision maker setting to the principal-agency setting.
Furthermore, they found support for the use of prospect
theory over expected utility theory, based on their
experimentation with 32 M.A. and Ph.D. students in
accounting.
Summary of Chapter Two
This chapter has presented a review and summary of two
general areas of research:

governmental budgeting at the

local level and decision making behavior under uncertainty.
Relevant theories and concepts of the governmental budgeting
function were identified.

In addition, the body of

literature on local governmental units and their budgeting
practices was discussed.

Perhaps most importantly, the

literature on small and rural governments was reviewed and
the need for a greater understanding of that form of
government was emphasized.
An area seemingly worthy of research in light of
increasing public activism is the area of decision making
behavior in the resource allocation process of small local
governments.

Because this is viewed as an issue of decision

making under uncertainty, prospect theory is believed to be
an appropriate approach to the study of such behavior.
Chapter three explains the methodology employed in the
extension of this literature.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
The current administration of the United States
government and many state governments have shifted much of
their decision making authority and responsibility to the
local governmental unit.

In addition, the citizenry has

become more active in monitoring governmental activity and
pursuing specific causes for governmental action, especially
at the local level.

Thus, local government decision makers

are forced to make more decisions and under the increasing
scrutiny of their constituency.
Little is currently known about the resource allocation
decision making behavior of local government decision makers
(of any size).^

Without knowledge of the current status, a

claim of the need for improvement may appear to be
unfounded.

Given the results of the little research that is

available on larger local governments' budgeting behavior;
however, it is difficult to accept the notion that smaller
local governments' behavior does not warrant attention.

It

seems reasonable to expect even greater subjectivity and
less sophistication to be present in the resource allocation
decision making process of smaller local governments in

^As mentioned in chapter two, more research is
available regarding local governments of greater than
50,000. A few case studies have been published on smaller
units. See chapter two for a literature review of this
area.
72

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

73
comparison with larger local g o v e r n m e n t s . ^

in this time of

increasing attention to government action, these decision
makers should be aware of their behavior and of the
influences on that behavior.

This is the focus of the

proposed study.
As stated in the first two chapters, the objective of
the study is to determine empirically whether the resource
allocation decisions of managers (or appropriate officials)
of small local governments are affected by altering the
frame of the various resource allocation alternatives under
consideration.

If such an effect is found, awareness of the

impact of framing may serve to improve resource allocation
decisions through the development and incorporation of more
comprehensive budget planning (and perhaps approval)
systems.

The objectives of this chapter are to identify

specific decision making behaviors deserving of
investigation at the small local government level and to
discuss the design and implementation of the appropriate
methodology for use in the investigation of these behaviors.
The chapter is composed of the following sections;

(1)

statement of the research question and hypotheses, (2) case
development,

(3) justification of the research strategy,

explanation of the experimental variables,

(4)

(5) discussion of

the statistical analyses to be employed, (6) a description
2Authorities on small governments have suggested
numerous reasons for the difference in behavior. See
Honadle [1983] for a review of the literature.
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of the pilot study, and (7) brief svunmary of the study and
expected results.
General Research Question
Many violations of rational decision theory (expected
utility theory) have been identified in the decision making
under uncertainty literature, and over the last decade
research has found support for the explanations of such
violations proposed by prospect theory.

Prospect theory has

been presented as descriptive of the process of evaluating
risky prospects.

It is based on the idea that preferences

are dependent on the formulation of the decision problem,
with the problem formulation being at least partially
dependent on the decision maker's perspective or frame of
reference.

Because of the nonlinearity of the value weights

and decision weights^ associated with risky prospects,
preferences among choices are dependent on the decision's
context.

If the weights were linear, the context would not

affect the preference order among risky prospects.
In contrast to expected utility theory, prospect theory
assumes nonlinearity to exist and decision problems to be
affected by altering the decision frames in terms of acts,
outcomes, or contingencies.

This proposed study will focus

on the latter two, and their effects on rational choice.
Decision acts can be framed in numerous ways which affect

^See Figures 8 and 9 of chapter 2.
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the desirability among alternatives of the decision problem.
For example, decision acts may be framed as judgments or as
choices, and as sets of either concurrent or independent
decisions.

Research has shown subjects tend not to

integrate choices even when monetarily rewarded for
integrating [Tversky and Kahneman, 1982].

Thus, by framing

acts as choices to be integrated rather than as
preintegrated choices, the presenter of information (or
context) can affect decision behavior.

Similarly, framing

of decision problems in terms of their outcomes is expected
to affect preferences among alternatives.
Prospect theory sees decision makers as evaluating
outcomes (alternatives) not in terms of ultimate positions
of wealth, but as changes in wealth from a neutral reference
point.

Thus, by presenting a reference point along with the

decision problem, the alternatives will be evaluated as
possible gains or losses from that point.

By changing the

reference point, preferences among alternatives may be
affected even when the alternatives are identical with
regard to ultimate positions of wealth (or welfare).

That

is, the value differences among prospects can be changed by
manipulating the reference point.

This aspect of prospect

theory is most closely related to the S-shaped value
function^ and the reflection effect discussed in chapter
two.

With regard to the framing of contingencies, the
^ See Figure 8 of chapter 2.
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nonlinearity of the decision weights^, again, affects the
preference order of decision alternatives.

Tversky and

Kahneman [1981] have found changes from impossible to
probable and from probable to certain to have greater
effects on decision preferences than similar changes in
probability which do not include the endpoints of
impossibility and certainty.
The framing of outcomes and contingencies effects are
to be tested by the current study and are discussed below,
following the statement of hypotheses.

The general research

question may be stated as follows;
Do budgeting managers of small local governments tend
to violate rational choice theory as a result of the
framing of the resource allocation problem?
The two previous chapters identified consistency and
coherence as requirements for rationality.

Thus, the

research question may be stated more precisely as:
Do budgeting managers of small local governments tend
to respond inconsistently or incoherently to
objectively identical resource allocation problems
framed differently?
Statement of Hvootheses
The general research question stated above may be
translated into three statistically testable hypotheses.
The hypotheses are stated in their null forms, and a
discussion of their expected results or alternative forms

^ See Figure 9 of chapter 2.
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will follow.

The hypotheses to be evaluated in this

research are;
HI: subjects will not alter their decision
preferences among different frames of the same
contingency in a resource allocation problem.
H2: subjects will not alter their decision
preferences between different frames of the same
outcome of a resource allocation problem.
H3: subjects will choose the alternative which
maximizes expected utility.
EXPECTED RESULTS OF HI
Prospect theory expects decision makers to change
preferences among alternatives as a result of a change in
the decision maker's point of reference regarding the
contingency present in a decision problem.

Thus, by

altering the frame of the resource allocation problem's
contingency this study should find that budget managers of
small local governments do violate rational decision theory.
In order to more fully explain the expectations
regarding this first hypothesis, the subjects' expected
decision behavior for three cases will be discussed.

Figure

3.1 lists the proposed cases to be employed in this
research, and these cases are referred to in the following
explanation of expected decision behavior.&
Cases 1, 2 and 3 relate to the first hypothesis.

The

responses to these three cases must be considered jointly in

® An explanation of case development and selection is
addressed in the following section of this chapter.
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the analysis of rational behavior.

Cases 2 and 3 are

identical as to probabilities and outcomes.

Thus,

consistency requires the same choice be made for the two
cases.

Furthermore, expected utility requires a preference

for choices B (case 2) and Z (case 3).

Assuming rational

decision makers, the frequencies for these choices should be
100%.

T&K have found that in case 2 subjects favor a sure

win (assuming the second level of the problem was reached,
which makes case 2 identical to case 1), even though the
expected utility was lower than the less certain
alternative.

The comparison of responses to cases 1, 2, and

3 serves as a test of the "isolation effect."

Subjects'

responses should be identical for cases 2 and 3, unless
subjects tend to isolate the two stages in case 2,
responding to the probabilities of stage 2 only.

In such a

case, the responses to case 1 and case 2 should be
identical.

Case 1 has been used in prior research to

emphasize the tendency for subjects to select the certain
alternative (demonstrate the "certainty effect") rather than
the alternative with the highest expected utility.

The

expected utility response frequencies for case 1 are 0% A
and 100% B.

The violations of expected utility theory

described above are expected to be evidenced in the decision
responses of the subjects of this proposed study.
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EXPECTED RESULTS OF H2.
Cases 4 and 5 (Figure 3.1) are representative of the
cases used to investigate and explain violations of expected
utility theory caused by alternative framings of objectively
identical outcomes for a decision problem.

These cases have

identical expected values, that is, each alternative
represents 20 jobs kept and 40 jobs lost.

Expected utility

theory would expect the response frequencies to be 50%-50%
between the two plans of case 4 as well as for case 5.
However, according to Tversky and Kahneman's work with
similarly structured cases [K&T, 1979; T&K 1981], subjects
are expected to prefer Plan A of case 4 and Plan D of case
5.

These expectations are based on prospect theory's

assertions that decision makers are risk averse when
evaluating among gain alternatives (as in case 4 as a result
of the "saving" of jobs approach) and risk seeking when
evaluating among loss alternatives (as in case 5 as a result
of the "loss" of jobs approach).

Alternatives for cases 4

and 5 all follow the same scenario of projected loss of
government employees' positions; however, the two different
approaches to wording the alternatives are expected to lead
to different decision behavior.
EXPECTED RESULTS OF H3.
Cases 1 through 5 will be used to test the third
hypothesis.

The expected results regarding H3 have been
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indirectly presented through the explanation of the expected
results of hypotheses 1 and 2.

The certainty, isolation.

FIGURE 3.1
Cases of Framing Alternatives
FRAMING OF CONTINGENCIES
Case 1:
A.
B.

Which of the following options do you prefer?
a sure receipt of $150,000 in federal funding for
capital improvements
80% chance of receiving $200,000 in federal
funding for capital improvements

Case 2: Without the expertise of a federal aid coordinator,
you feel it is extremely unlikely that your government will
secure any federal funding. Thus, your government has begun
negotiations to hire a federal aid coordinator in efforts to
improve your chances of obtaining federal funding for
capital improvements and special programs. You know that
the applicants for the coordinator position are also
negotiating with other governmental units, and you estimate
that you have a 25% chance of hiring one of the applicants.
If you hire one of the specialists you feel absolutely
confident that the coordinator can secure $150,000 for
capital improvements by focusing all energies on a specific
strategy, and you are 80% confident that the coordinator can
secure $200,000 by pursuing an alternative strategy.
Preliminary paperwork must be submitted for approval by the
council before the hiring process is expected to be
completed. Which one of the coordinator strategies would
you choose to present to the council?
A;

($150,000)

or

B:

($200,000, .80)

Case 3: Your government's federal aid coordinator has two
strategic options available for the current period's
consideration. Option Z has a 20% chance of resulting in
federal aid of $200,000. Option Y has a 25% chance of
resulting in federal aid of $150,000. Which option would
you encourage the coordinator to pursue:
Z:

($200,000, .2)

or

Y:

($150,000, .25)
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(Figure 3.1, continued)
FRAMING OF OUTCOMES
Based on their research indicating a trend in decreasing
federal aid and an increasing demand for total governmental
expenditures, your budget office projects the need to layoff
60 government employees. However, two plans to alleviate
this need for layoffs were submitted along with the budget
staff's projection. Which plan would you favor? [This will
be accompanied by either case 4 or case 5].
Case 4‘:

Plan A is guaranteed to save 20 employees from the
layoff.
Plan B has a 1/3 probability of saving all
employees from the layoff and a 2/3 probability of
saving none of the employees from the layoff.

Case 5:

Plan C is guaranteed to result in a loss of 40
government employee jobs.
Plan D has a 1/3 probability that no government
employee jobs will be lost and a 2/3 probability
that 60 government employee jobs will be lost.

and reflection effects are all expected to contribute toward
the rejection of H3.

Because of the alternative

presentations of objectively identical information, subjects
are not expected to consistently choose the alternative of
higher expected value.
Case Development
As seen in Figure 3.1, this study will employ five
cases.

This section describes the rationale for inclusion

of these particular cases.

Topic selection and case design

are described below.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

82
TOPIC SELECTION.
During the literature review process, several issues
regarding local government activity were identified.
Resource allocation activities (e.g., capital budgeting)
which appeared to rely on a decision making under
uncertainty process were collected and considered for
incorporation into this study.

Of the issues collected,

those seemingly applicable across the population of small
local governments were given further consideration.

For

example, it is highly likely that all local governments
within this study's population must consider issues of
pollution control and water treatment.

Thus, these issues

were given additional consideration for inclusion in the
study.
Issues dropped from further consideration were those
which seemed to rely on decision making under uncertainty,
but which did not seem likely to relate to the entire
population of small governments.

For example, while the

allocation of resources to the development of recreational
facilities is a decision making under uncertainty issue,
many very small local governments may not have the luxury of
considering the issue at all.

Thus, the recreational

facilities issue was dropped from further case
consideration.
Two fundamental issues were chosen for incorporation
into the experimental cases.

The issues are discussed below
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with reference to the related hypotheses and cases.
Hypothesis 3 will be tested with all five cases.

Therefore,

the discussion of selected case topics for HI and H2 each
apply to H3 as well.
Hypothesis 1 will be tested with the first three cases
of Figure 3.1, which represent a gain contingency inasmuch
as they refer only to possible inflows of resources.

The

issue addressed in these cases is federal funding for
capital improvements.

Capital budgeting is included among

the fundamental issues confronting governmental decision
makers of any size of governmental unit.

Thus, subjects are

expected to be familiar with the issue and the issue is
expected to be relevant to all subjects.

Because of the

expected diversity among the subjects, the capital
improvements issue is left in a generic form rather than
more specific types and degrees of capital improvements.
This approach is believed to present the cases in a form to
which all subjects can relate.

The incorporation of a

federal aid coordinator is believed to be applicable across
the population inasmuch as small governmental units can
obtain the services of a circuit-riding federal aid
coordinator (or perhaps consulting services from a local
university, etc.) or hire a permanent coordinator.

Whether

part-time or full-time help is obtained, professional help
is considered to be necessary in negotiating with the
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federal government in light of the trend of decreasing
amounts of federal funding to the local level of government.
Hypothesis 2 will be tested with cases 4 and 5 of
Figure 3.1.
cases.

Subjects will receive only one of these two

Similar to the topic of cases 1 through 3, the topic

of cases 4 and 5 are expected to be highly relevant to the
population being studied.

Issues of employment are of

concern to most of America on an aggregate or nationwide
level but concern seems to grow stronger as the employment
issues strike at the local level (i.e., "closer to home").
Moreover, those persons responsible for the budgeting
process confront the issue repeatedly, whether in a lineitem budget as wages and salaries are reviewed or in some
other approach to budget preparation.

The question of

sufficient manpower is fundamental to any organization.

The

census will be a source of information for incorporating
meaningful numbers into the cases, for example, regarding
the size of the governmental labor force and federal capital
improvements dollars received for units within the
population of study.
CASE DESIGN
The study consists of two sets of cases (cases 1-3 &
cases 4-5).

Each set is designed to be a test of different

implications of framing.

The first three cases are designed

to detect the isolation effect, the certainty effect and the
pseudo-certainty effect.

Case 1 is a test of the certainty
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effect.

Prospect theory suggests that subjects will select

the risk averse alternative when alternatives are framed as
gains from their reference point, as in case 1.

The case is

designed so that the option of certainty is not the option
of higher expected value.

If expected utility theory holds

true, subjects should prefer the $10,000 higher expected
value of option B.
Case 2 is designed to test the isolation and pseudo
certainty effects.

Subjects who choose option A over option

B are assumed to isolate stage 1 (hiring a coordinator) from
stage 2 (choosing an option or strategy) of the decision
problem.

They do not perceive two risky prospects resulting

from the conditions of the first stage.

Subjects who

isolate these stages are expected to select the option they
consider to be a certainty (option A) even though option B
has a higher expected value.

Isolation of the stages

results in cases 1 and 2 being identical as to probabilities
and outcomes.

However, if the subjects integrate stages 1

and 2 of case 2, the probabilities and outcomes are
identical to those of case 3.

The interrelated structure of

the three cases was designed to detect violations of the two
accepted characteristics of rational decision behavior —
coherence and consistency.
Cases 4 and 5, focusing on government layoffs, are
designed to test the reflection effect and the certainty
effect.

That is, the framing of objectively identical
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alternatives as gains in case 4 and as losses in case 5
should result in different behavior.

Subj ects are expected

to apply different value weights in evaluating options on
the gain side of their reference point than when evaluating
objectively identical options on the loss side of their
reference point.

The cases were designed to include an

option of sure gain in case 4 and of sure loss in case 5,
which will aid in detecting the presence of a certainty
effect.

If expected utility theory holds, subjects should

be indifferent among the four options (A through D) and
subject preferences should be evenly distributed among the
options.
hold,

However, if the reflection and certainty effects

(1) subjects should prefer the certain gain of case 4,

which suggests risk averse behavior in light of gains; and
(2) subjects should prefer the gamble of case 5, which
suggests risk seeking behavior in light of losses.
Justification of the Research Strateav
The research strategy proposed for this study is a
quasi-field experiment.?

This strategy is proposed as an

attempt to maximize both internal and external validity to
the extent possible.®

Several threats to both internal and

external validity will not be controlled for, however, due
?See Stone [1978, pp. 124-128] for a discussion of the
field experiment.
®See Campbell and Stanley [1963] for a discussion of
the concepts of internal and external validity.
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to the necessary trade off of controls over one type of
validity for controls over the other.

For example, external

validity is increased by securing responses from actual
managers or budget officials rather than using some
surrogate subject group.

However, the survey approach

necessary to obtain a sufficient number of responses
representative of the population of small local governmental
units forces the experimenter to relinquish some of the
control over internal validity available in a true lab
experiment.

Given the lack of information available on the

target population for this study as well as the costs and
time required for a more controlled approach, the survey
approach seems justified.

Furthermore, use of a pilot study

(see the penultimate section of this chapter) and
consultation with a city manager regarding the case scenario
mundane and experimental realism, should reduce many threats
to the validity of the study.
A review of Figure 3.1 might lead one to another
limitation in the ability of this study to explain decision
making behavior of the subjects.

First, cases 1 through 3

form a set of decisions providing insight with regard to
gain contingencies only.

Different behaviors may be

associated with a similar set of decisions framed as loss
contingencies.

Investigation of this question is not

considered feasible for practical reasons.

Adding another

case to each instrument would likely reduce the response
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rate and possibly sensitize subjects to the objectives of
the study.

The alternative to lengthening the instrument

would double the subjects required for the study.
Similarly, the scenario for cases 4 and 5 employed a loss
outcome (projected 60 employees laid off) and framed
alternatives as gains (case 4) or losses (case 5).
Differences in decision behavior might have been noted had
the scenario employed a gain outcome (e.g., jobs created)
and framed alternatives as gains or losses.9 These framing
limitations are left to be addressed as an extension of the
current study.
Explanation of the Experimental Variables
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The dependent variable is the manager's choice or
preference of outcomes and contingencies related to the
decision problem.

This variable is dichotomous for each of

the decision cases used in the study (see Figure 3.1).
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
There are two independent variables of framing included
in this study:

(l) framing of contingencies, and (2)

framing of outcomes.

The first will be operationalized by

employing the first three cases in Figure 3.1.

Each subject

^Harwood, Pate, and Schneider [unpublished, 1988] have
done some work in this area, however, no published cites are
currently available.
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will be randomly assigned to one of the three cases.

The

second independent variable will be operationalized by
employing cases 4 and 5 of Figure 3.1.

Each subject will be

randomly assigned to one of either case 4 or 5.

Thus, each

subject will be randomly assigned to two cases which
operationalize the two independent variables (see Figure
3.2).

Following consultation with a city manager, the pilot

study (described below) will investigate the effectiveness
of the manipulation, or the impact of these independent
variables on the dependent variable.

FIGURE 3.2
Versions of the Test Instrument
V E R S I 0 N
1

c
A
S
E
S

1
2
3
4
5

2

3

X

4

5

X
X

X
X

6

X

X

X
X
X

X

X

Statistical Analvses
Responses to the five cases will be evaluated in terms
of the consistency and coherency requirements of rational
choice theory, as discussed above.

Each case elicits

dichotomous responses which are mutually exclusive, and
employs a nominal measurement scale.
nonparametric test is appropriate.

Therefore, a
A binomial test may be

used to draw inferences about the population proportion.
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The expected frequencies (hypothesized population
proportions) will be based on the well-accepted expected
utility theory.
Three assumptions must be addressed in order to justify
use of the binomial test.

The first assumption is that the

data consist of the outcomes of n repeated Bernoulli trials
(i.e., each outcome consists of either of two possible
responses).
independent.

The second assumption is that the n trials are
The third assumption is that the probabilities

associated with the response categories remain constant from
trial to trial.

This assumption is dependent on expected

utility theory and rational decision behavior.

It is

believed that the necessary assumptions will be reasonably
satisfied by the current study, and the use of a binomial
test may be deemed appropriate for the data analyses.
Given scenarios where the expected utility between
alternatives is objectively identical, the Chi-square test
will be used to test the null hypothesis that the sampled
population responses do follow binomial distributions.10

If

the null is true, the expected frequency can be computed as
the product of the sample size and the corresponding
category probability.

Once the expected frequencies have

lOgee Levin [1984, p. 215] for a discussion of the
criteria for classification as a binomial distribution and
Daniel [1978, ch.8] for a discussion of the appropriate use
of the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test.
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been calculated, the Chi-square test statistic below can be
used for each applicable scenario.
x2 =

(Oj -

Ei
The decision rule is to reject the null at the alpha
significance level if

where r is the number

of categories and g represents the number of parameters
(expected frequency in this case) which must be estimated.
In the cases where uniform distribution is expected, no
expected frequency calculation using sample data is
necessary.
r-1.

Thus, the degrees of freedom would simply be

The test statistic and decision rule will be identical

to those for the binomial distribution situation [Daniel,
1978, ch.8].
Pilot Study
As mentioned several times throughout this chapter, a
pilot study will be administered as an aid in preparation of
the survey instrument to be used in the study of local
governmental decision makers' decision behavior.

Officials

of small local governments around the Baton Rouge area will
be randomly assigned to one of the versions of the test
instrument presented in Figure 3.2.

They will be mailed a

cover letter accompanied by a pre-addressed and stamped bi
fold questionnaire (see Appendix A).

They will be asked to

consider and respond to two cases by assuming their role of
budget manager for their small local government.

In
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addition, they will be asked to answer several demographic
questions which are planned to appear on the test instrument
of the actual study.

By administering the entire test

instrument (including demographics), some awareness of the
response rate should be obtained even though the
demographics on the test instrument will not be relevant in
the pilot study.

Subjects of the pilot study will be asked

to write any comments or constructive criticisms on a blank
piece of paper.

These experienced managers should provide

valuable comments, particularly with regard to the
reasonableness of the case scenario topics.

Once all

comments have been considered and the data collected from
the pilot study has been analyzed, any noted weaknesses in
the test instrument will be adjusted to the extent possible.
Summary
This chapter presented the methodology chosen for the
analysis of local governmental decision making behavior in
situations of uncertainty.

Issues of reduced federal

funding and governmental employee layoffs were presented as
the uncertainty situations to be used in the assessment of
rational decision making behavior.

Although expected

utility theory has been widely accepted as an explanation of
decision making under uncertainty, elements of prospect
theory, such as the reflection effect and the certainty
effect, were explained as being potentially more
descriptive of the subjects' decision making behavior.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS AND ANALYSES
The purpose of this chapter is to present and explain
the results of the study described in the previous chapter.
The chapter is divided into the following sections for
discussion;
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Review of the research methodology,
Review of the sampling procedure,
Demographics,
General case results,
Analyses of hypotheses,
Personal interviews,
Summary and conclusions.
Review of the Research Methodology

A quasi-field experiment was conducted and data was
collected by means of a mail survey.

Six hundred

governmental units throughout the United States were
randomly selected to participate in this study.

The study

examines the responses of the local governmental units'
budgeting managers for violations of rational choice.^

The

research proposition of interest is as follows:
Budgeting managers tend to respond inconsistently and
incoherently to objectively identical resource
allocation alternatives framed differently.
In order to investigate this proposition, three specific
research hypotheses were developed and tested.

^Recall from previous chapters that researchers have
accepted consistent and coherent choice behavior as rational
choice behavior, and expected utility theory as the
predominant theory of decision making under uncertainty.
93
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The study measures a single dependent variable, which
is the subject's preference among alternatives related to
the decision problem confronting the subject.

Subject

responses to five cases were used to assess the concepts of
consistency and coherency, which serve as measures of
rational decision behavior.

For each case employed, the

dependent variable is a dichotomous decision choice.
The independent variables are the frames of the
decision problems (or cases).

A brief description of the

five cases used in this study is presented in Table 4.1.
Cases one through three are framed as a gain.

The factor

that is experimentally manipulated is the framing of
contingencies (i.e., probabilities).

The manipulation is

operationalized by providing information in non
preintegrated (case 2) or preintegrated (case 3) form.

Case

one serves, mainly, in the assessment of subjects' decision
processing strategy, which aids in the interpretation of
cases two and three.%

Cases four and five assess the impact

of the framing of outcomes by presenting objectively
identical information in either a gain frame (case 4) or a
loss frame (case 5).

In both of these cases, the expected

outcomes of the decision alternatives are identical.

Of

interest is the effect of varying the frame on subjects'
preference for (or tolerance of) uncertainty.
^The interrelationships among cases one through three
are discussed along with the survey's results in a later
section of this chapter.
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Review of the Sampling Procedure
Above, it was mentioned that 600 local governments were
selected to participate in this study by responding to some
of the cases listed in Table 4.1 as well as several
demographic items.

This section of chapter four reviews the

sampling procedure employed in obtaining the list of 600
governmental units surveyed.
TABLE 4.1
CASE DESCRIPTION
Case
1

Frame

Tooic

Alternatives

Gain

Federal
Funding

1. Receive $150,000
2. 80% probability of
receiving $200,000

2

Gain
(not pre
integrated)

Federal
Funding

1. 25% probability of
opportunity to
receive $150,000
2. 25% probability of
opportunity for
80% probability of
receiving $200,000

3

Gain
(pre- ._
integrated)

Federal
Funding

1. 25% probability of
receiving $150,000
2. 20% probability of
receiving $200,000

Status of
60 jobs

1. Save 20 jobs
2. 1/3 probability of
saving 60 jobs;
2/3 probability of
saving no jobs.

Status of
60 jobs

1. Lose 40 jobs
2. 1/3 probability of
losing no jobs;
2/3 probability of
losing all jobs.

4

5

Gain

Loss
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The purpose of this study was to research the decision
making behavior of the individuals responsible for the
allocation of resources (budgeting) within small local
governments.

"Small" government is defined as local levels

of government serving no more than 10,000 people.

In the

interest of external validity, a random sampling procedure
was used.

The Bureau of the Census publishes a directory of

U.S. governmental units.

The population of interest for

this study was a subset of that directory.

Governments

serving 10,000 people or less were identified within the
1987 directory of all active governmental units in the U.S.
Then, a random number generator provided a list of 600
numbers which were matched with the directory's observation
numbers.

The governments corresponding to the matching

observation numbers were included in the sample.
SAMPLE SIZE
Fleiss [1981] provides a table identifying the sample
sizes required per group for a two-tailed test on
proportions, given anticipated proportions, alpha and power
levels.

Tversky and Kahneman's [1981 & K&T,1979] research

findings were used as a priori proportions for each of the
five cases.

Also, for purposes of determining an adequate

sample size for each case from Fleiss' table, the alpha and
power levels were set at .05 and .8, respectively.

Having

set those criteria, the appropriate number of subjects
required for analysis of particular cases is thirty-six
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subjects for comparison of cases two and three.

Thus, the

sample size is based on eighteen subjects per version of the
survey (see Table 4.2).

As can be seen in Table 4.2, each

version contains two different cases.

Because there was no

response rate information available in the literature
regarding surveys of local governmental units, the pilot
study response rate of 20% was incorporated in the sample
size calculation.

Thus, it was believed that the necessary

eighteen responses per version would be obtained by mailing
one hundred surveys per version (or six hundred surveys).

TABLE 4.2
SURVEY VERSIONS AND REQUIRED RESPONSES
Case
1

VI

V2

18

18

2

Vers;ion
V4
V3

18

5

18
18

Total subjects
oer case

36

18
18

18

V6

36

3
4

V5

18

18
18

36
54

18

54

FIRST MAILING
Each subject received a one-page letter with two cases
printed on the back and a self-addressed, postage-paid
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response form.^

The letter solicited subject participation

and asked subjects to use the accompanying response form to
indicate their preferences to the cases.

Thus, only the

response form was returned by the subjects.

Because the

subject mailing list was in alphabetical order by state, the
six versions were assigned to the specific subjects by an
orderly rotation of versions from the top to the bottom of
the mailing list.

That is, every sixth subject on the list

received the same version of the survey and accompanying
response form.
The first mailing consisted of six hundred surveys,
mailed by first class mail.

Of those six hundred survey

packets, ten were returned as undeliverable and one response
form was returned indicating that the subject was not a
governmental unit.

The majority of the undeliverable

packets indicated that the subject (government) left no
forwarding address.

These units may have become inactive

since the compilation of the directory.

In addition, a few

of the undeliverable packets were returned marked
insufficient address.

Because the surveys were mailed first

class, it was assumed that the eleven returns were the only
problems with the mailing.

Thus, the eleven problem

subjects were removed from the denominator for the response
rate calculation.

As a result of the first mailing, the

^See Appendix A for a copy of the letters and response
form.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

99
response rate was 32.1%, which exceeds the targeted response
rate of 20%.

Table 4.3 shews the number of responses per

version for both the initial and follow up mailing.
SECOND MAILING
A second mailing was sent to those subjects who had not
responded by the third week following the initial mailing.
Each subject was mailed the same version in both mailings.
Suprisingly, one of the survey packets was returned
"undeliverable— attempted unknown" from the second mailing.
Thus, although the use of first class mail provides greater
assurance that all packets were received by the addressee
government or returned to sender, there is no guarantee of
receipt.

As a result of the second mailing, the response

rate increased to 47.4% (see Table 4.3).

A chi-square

comparison showed no significant difference in response
rates among the versions.

TABLE 4.3
NUMBER OF RESPONSES PER VERSION
V E R S I O N S
3
1
2

4

5

6

Target Response

18

18

18

18

18

18

First Mailing

34

29

33

34

37

22

Second Mailing

18

17

13

17

10

15

Combined

52

46

46

51

47

37
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Demographics
The survey instrument served to collect ten pieces of
demographic information from each subject in the sample.
Five items focused on the individual, the governmental
official, who responded to the survey.

The other five items

focused on the governmental unit with which the individual
is associated.

Table 4.4 summarizes all demographic

information collected regarding the individual survey
respondent.

Similarly, Table 4.5 is devoted to the

demographic information regarding the governmental unit
represented by the individual survey respondent.

The

empirical evidence provided by this survey will help to
support or refute statements regarding small governmental
units which have been merely conjecture to date.

The

implications of these demographics are discussed in a later
section of this chapter.
SURVEY RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS
As shown in Table 4.4, the five demographic items
focusing on the individual can be grouped into three topic
areas for discussion:

(1) education,

(2) governmental

experience, and (3) selection procedure for current
position.

Each of these areas are briefly discussed below.

Education.

Completion of high school was the highest

level of education achieved by 44% of the respondents.
However, approximately 54% of the respondents earned at
least a two-year (associates) college degree.

Moreover,
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TABLE 4.4
SURVEY RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS
Education
Highest Degree Obtained:
High School
Associates
Bachelors
Masters
Doctorate

Number
Percent123
44. 1
33
11.8
71
25.4
47
16.8
.4
1
275
98.5
*Four subjects did not respond to this item.

Area of Study
(for highest degree)
General High School
Governmental
Business
Other

Number
Percent123
44.1
34
12.2
46
16.5
60
21.5
263
94.3
Sixteen subjects did not respond to this item.

Years
Y
1
Y
5
Y
10
Y
20
Y

<
<
<
<

Includes

Governmental Experience
In Current
In
Position
Budgeting
Number Percent
Number Percent
41
14.7
10.4
1"
29
25.8
100
35.8
5
72
26.5
60
21.5
10
74
28.7
61
80
21.9
20
8.6
17
6.1
24
100
100.0
279
279
subjects who did not respond to this item.

Selection Procedure For Current Position
Number
Percent
Elected
116
42
Appointed
163
58
279
100

approximately 17% of the respondents earned advanced (post
baccalaureate) degrees, including one doctorate.
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Most respondents who indicated attainment of degrees
beyond high school also indicated the area of study in their
college programs.

Of that 54% of the survey respondents

earning at least a two-year college degree, 24% indicated a
program concentrating on some form of governmental
administration, and 33% indicated a program which would
appropriately be classified as a business program.

The

remaining respondents indicated a variety of education and
science degrees.
Experience.
experience.

Two demographic items focused on

One question asked respondents to indicate how

many years of governmental budgeting experience they
possess.

The category of highest frequency was that for

between 10 and 20 years of such budgeting experience, with
approximately 29% of the respondents.

The average number of

years of budgeting experience for the survey respondents was
9.8 years.

The second question regarding experience asked

respondents to indicate how many years they have held their
current position within their governmental unit.

Table 4.4

shows that approximately 36% of the respondents have held
their positions for some period of time between one and five
years.

The average number of years of respondents'

experience in their current position was 7.8 years.

With

regard to both the respondents' experience in their current
position and their governmental budgeting experience, the
lowest level of experience was associated with respondents
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who had been positioned just prior to the survey (0 years).
The highest level of experience for both demographic items
was thirty-seven years.
Selection.

The fifth demographic item to be discussed

asked respondents how they were selected to serve in their
current position.

Fifty-eight percent of the respondents

indicated that they had been appointed rather than elected
to their current position.

Governmental budgeting

literature suggests that appointees may behave differently
from elected officials.

Results from this demographic item

will help to support or refute that notion, and are
discussed in the hypotheses analysis section of this
chapter.
GOVERNMENTAL UNIT DEMOGRAPHICS
Half of the demographic questions included within the
survey instrument focused on the governmental unit
represented by the respondent.

Each of those five items is

briefly discussed below and summarized in Table 4.5.

These

demographics were intended to contribute to the
interpretation of case responses by providing some insight
as to the actual characteristics of responding governmental
units, which might have influenced the way that the
respondent related to the case scenarios.

In addition, this

information contributes to a foundation for future research
focusing on small governmental units.
Population.

The instrument was intended to survey a
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TABLE 4.5
GOVERNMENTAL UNIT DEMOGRAPHICS
Population Size
Percent
Number
(P)
of Units
of Units
Population
0.7
P
100
2
4.3
100
P
500
12
10.0
500
P
1000
28
39.8
1000
P
111
3000
22.2
62
3000
5000
P
20
7.2
5000
7000
P
12.5
35
7000
1000
P
2.5
7
10000
P
99.2
277
Two subjects did not indicate size.
Type of Government
Number
of Units
Type_____
192
Municipality
82
Township
1
Village
1
County
3
Other
279
Number of Employees
Number
(E)
of Units
Employees
121
E < 10
112
10 < E < 50
36
50 < E < 100
10
100 < E
279

Percent
of Units
68.8
29.4
0.4
0.4
1.1
100.0
Percent
of Units
43.4
40.1
12.9
3.6
100.0

Employs A Full-time Budget Officer
Percent
Number
of Units
of Units
Budget Officer
19.0
Yes
53
81.0
226
No
100.0
279
1987 Federal Funding For Capital Improvements
Percent
Number
(F)
of Units
of Units
Funds fOOOs)
10.0
28
F < 100
8.6
24
100 < F < 400
3.9
11
400 < F < 1000
2.5
7
1000 < F
25.0
70
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random sample of governmental units ranging in size from a
population of less than one hundred people to approximately
ten thousand people.

Table 4.5 indicates that the sample

surveyed was within the range of sizes intended.

However,

one of the respondent units had grown significantly from the
time of the 1980 census count.

Based on the 1980 census,

the particular governmental unit had a population of no more
than ten thousand people, but by the survey date the unit’s
size had grown to approximately twenty-five thousand.
Because this unit was viewed as an outlier (and
substantially outside this study's definition of small
government), the unit was not included in the calculation of
the average population size of governmental units
responding.

The average population for respondents meeting

the definition of small government employeed by this study
was 3,605 people.

The largest and smallest population of

responding units was 12,500 and thirty-five, respectively.
Type of Government.

The survey asked respondents to

indicate whether their unit fell into one of five specified
categories or some other (nonspecified) category.
Approximately 98% of the responding governmental units fell
into just two categories of government type.
comprise 69% of all responding units.

Municipalities

It is interesting to

note that, based on the other demographics, there did not
appear to be any pattern or rule for units earning any
particular status (e.g., municipality versus township).
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Such status appears to be dictated by the state in which the
governmental unit operates.

Based on population, the data

suggests no uniformity in classification of the subject
units, taken as a whole.

For example, all respondents

located in Arizona, California and Texas indicated that
their units are classified as municipalities, regardless of
size.

Respondents of many other states indicated a split

between township and municipality status, which is
apparently based on something other than population size.
That is, either classification is used for units of any
particular size.
Employees.

Two demographic items addressed issues

regarding the governmental units' employees.

One item asks

respondents to indicate the number of employees employed by
the respondents' unit.

Approximately 83% of the responding

units employed no more than fifty employees.

The average

number of employees for all responding units was twentyseven.

The number of employees ranged from none to 206

being employed by a single unit.
Upon review of the responses received, it is evident
that this demographic item should be interpreted and used
cautiously.

It appears that some of the respondents

considered part-time employees to be different from full
time employees for the purpose of answering this survey
item.

Thus, respondents who did not identify the number of

full- and part-time employees within their units might have
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responded with the total number of employees.
Alternatively, they might have responded just with the
number of full-time employees.

Elected and contracted

positions did not appear to be viewed by any of the
respondents as being positions of employment within the
governmental units.
The second demographic item addressing the governmental
units' employees is related to the amount of time and
attention devoted to the units' budgeting process.

Eighty-

one percent of the respondents indicated that their unit
does not employ a full-time budget officer.

This finding is

consistent with findings of case studies published to date.4
Of the 19% of the units that do employ such an employee,
79% stated that their budget officers were appointed rather
than elected.

A comparison of responses to the question of

whether or not the individual respondent was elected or
appointed and the question of whether or not the budget
officer was appointed or elected suggests that, in almost
every instance where it was indicated that the unit employs
a full-time budget officer, the respondent was the budget
officer.

Results of the comparison lend support to the

belief that the subjects responding to the survey were the
subjects intended.5
^For example, see Honadle [1983].
^Recall that the survey instrument was addressed to the
subject governmental unit to the attention of the budget
preparer.
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Funding.

Current business and public administration

literature suggests that state and local governments are
receiving less support for capital improvements in the form
of federal funds.

For example, Hoffman, Mister and Strawser

[1988, p. 105] state that such funding has decreased 19%
over the period from 1960 to 1986.®

Seventy-five percent of

the respondents received no federal funds for capital
improvements in 1987.

Federal support averaged $432,807 for

the 25% of the governmental units receiving funding in 1987.
The lowest and highest funding amounts were $325 and
$3,666,000, respectively, with a median of $115,000.
General Case Results
The results of this study are analyzed from two
perspectives.

Because the objective of the study is to

assess the decision making behavior of the subjects with
regard to rationality, the study's null hypotheses are
tested in terms of expected utility theory.

However,

prospect theory is also employed in the analysis.

As

discussed in chapter two, prospect theory offers
explanations for deviations in decision making behavior from
that predicted by expected utility theory.

Thus, a

®The significance of this decrease in funding might be
more clearly expressed, in constant dollar terms. The Office
of Management and Budget [1983] used 1982 as the base year,
to estimate that federal funding to state and local
governments for capital improvements has decreased
approximately $3,900,000,000 over the ten year period from
1977 to 1987.
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combination of the two theories may be used to predict
decision making behavior in light of the presentation of
information to the decision maker.

Before analyzing

respondents' decisions in terms of the three hypotheses of
this study, it is interesting to note the degree of
similarity among (1) the respondents' choices in this study,
(2) the choices made by respondents of prior research, and
(3) the choices predicted by expected utility theory.
Choices were made between decision alternatives for each of
five cases.

Table 4.1 summarizes the five cases for

reference throughout this chapter.

As illustrated in Table

4.2, each subject received only two cases (one version).
Chi-square tests show that the subjects' preferences were
not significantly influenced by the combination of cases
(the particular version) confronting them.

Similarly, there

were no significant differences in results of the first
mailing when compared to the results of the second mailing.
Table 4.6 shows that, for three of the five cases,
respondents of the current study have response frequencies
very similar to those of respondents of prior research.

For

each of the three cases (cases 1, 2, & 4), current and prior
research vary greatly from expected utility frequencies.
Similarly, response frequencies for case 3 of the current
study differ from expected utility theory.

However, the

results of that case do not confirm prior research response
frequencies.

As will be discussed later in this chapter, it
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is interesting to note a greater divergence between expected
utility theory and the current study's response frequencies
than between expected utility theory and prior research with
regard to case 3 responses.

Case 5 of the current study

also differs from prior research, but the response
frequencies of the current study are very similar to those
predicted by expected utility theory.

Thus, four of the

five cases differ from expected utility theory; three of the
five cases confirm prior research as to deviations of
response frequencies from expected utility theory; two of
the five cases differ from prior research response
frequencies, with the response frequencies of one of those
two being very similar to that predicted by expected utility
TABLE 4.6
CASE RESULTS OF CURRENT STUDY (C) VERSUS
PRIOR RESEARCH (?) * AND EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY (E)
CASE 1
A
B

CASE 2
A
B

CASE 3
Z
Y

CASE 4
A
B

CASE 5
C

D

c

87%
13%
n=: .00

76%

24%
n==89

43%

57%
n==82

21%
79%
n=: .40

48%
52%
n=: .29

p

80%
20%
n=f35

78%
22%
n=:L41

65%

35%
n==95

28%
72%
n=]L52

78%
22%
n=:.55

E

0% 100%

0% 100%

100%

0%

50%

50%

50%

50%

Prior research results taken from Tversky and Kahneman
[1986] and Kahneman and Tversky [1979].
The table reflects percentages of case responses.
The sample size of each case is indicated by the
notation, "n=," appearing below each set of percentages.
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theory.

Again, implications of these similarities and

differences are presented in the following sections of this
chapter.
Survey Results and the Hypotheses
Each of the three research hypotheses are discussed
individually below.

First, the purpose of each hypothesis

as well as the expected results of the survey cases, with
regard to each hypothesis, are presented.

Then, actual

survey results and analyses, in terms of both prior research
and expected utility theory, follow.
HYPOTHESIS 1
HI: subjects will not alter their decision preferences
among different frames of the same contingency in a
resource allocation problem.
The null form of hypothesis one is based on expected
utility theory, and is tested using cases one, two, and
three of the current study (see Table 4.1).

The alternative

hypothesis is based on prior research in prospect theory,
and states that decision preferences will change direction
among alternatives as a result of changing the reference
point regarding the contingency present in a decision
problem.
Case 1.

Case one puts decision makers at the start of

a single stage decision where they must choose between a
sure gain and a probable gain of higher expected value
($150,000 vs $160,000).

Prospect theory expects risk averse

behavior in a gain-framed situation, thus, decision makers
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are expected to prefer the sure $150,000 over the 80%
probable $200,000.

Kahneman and Tversky [1979] describe

subjects as experiencing a "certainty effect" in their
preference for a sure payoff of lower expected value over a
probable payoff of greater expected value.

Expected utility

theory predicts that the decision maker choose the
alternative with the higher expected value (i.e., $200,000 x
80% = $160,000).
A chi-square test shows a significant difference
between the respondents' preference and the expected utility
preference (see Table 4.7).

Eighty-seven percent of the

subjects in the current study chose the sure gain over the
risky gain of higher expected value.

It is assumed that,

all else being equal, subjects would prefer receiving more
money than less.

If subjects had focused on the dollar

amounts, they would have compared $150,000 to $200,000, and
chosen the latter.

Results indicate that this was not done.

Thus, subjects appear to have experienced the "certainty
effect" by considering the probabilities, and violating
expected utility theory.
Case 2.

Case two presents a two-stage decision

situation, and gives subjects a choice of placing
themselves at the start of either one of the two stages
(again, refer to Table 4.1 for case summaries).

According

to prospect theory [K&T, 1979], subjects view themselves at

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without p erm ission.

113

one or the other of the two stages depending on their
decision processing strategy.

If subjects are what Tversky

TABLE 4.7
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CASES ONE, TWO AND THREE
BASED ON CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC
Comparison to Expected Utility Theory
Computed
Significance
Case
Chi-souare—
Level
1
1415.58
.005
2
841.05
.005
3
375.71
.005
*These test statistics are conservative as
a result of forcing the category of smaller
expected frequency from a frequency of zero
to a frequency of five (minimum expected
frequency allowed for chi-square).
Comparison Between Current Study Cases
Test
Significance
Cases
Statistic—
Level
1-2
6.63
.010
2-3
14.88
.005
Comparison of Current Study to Prior Research—
Test.
Significance
Case
Statistic^
Level
1
3.06
.100
2
.06
**
3
7.04
.010
*Tversky & Kahneman [K&T, 1973 & T&K, 1331]
results represent the expected frequencies for
comparison tc those observed in current study.
** Not significant.

and Kahneman refer to as "standard formulation" information
processors, the decision maker will consider themselves at
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the start of the first of two stages.

These subjects will

not perceive a certain option and a risky option in case
two.

Rather, both options will be viewed as only probable.

Thus, they should choose the option of higher expected value
((20% (or 25% X 80%) x $200,000) rather than the other
option of (25% x $150,000)).
However, subjects may be what Tversky and Kahneman
refer to as "sequential formulation" information processors.
If so, the decision maker will consider themselves at the
start of the second of the two stages.

That is, they

experience what Kahneman and Tversky [1979] refer to as the
"isolation effect," isolating stage one from stage two of
the decision problem.

These subjects ignore the first

stage, seeing it as necessary to both options of the second
stage.

Thus, as in case one, the decision makers are

choosing between what is perceived as a certain $150,000 and
a risky $200,000 ($160,000 expected value).

Kahneman and

Tversky [1979] refer to the perceived certainty as
"pseudocertainty" inasmuch as there is no certain option for
the decision problem as a whole.
Subjects of the current study appear to have processed
the information in a sequential manner, ignoring the 25%
chance of reaching the second stage of the two-stage
problem.

As mentioned above, ignoring the first stage leads

the subjects to perceive one certain option and one risky
option, which should lead to response frequencies similar to
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those of case one.

Seventy-six percent of the subjects in

the current study chose the option of $150,000 (expected
value $37,500).

Only 24% of the subjects chose the option

of $200,000 (expected value $40,000).

As Tabli 4.7

indicates, there is a significant difference between
respondents' preferences and that predicted by expected
utility theory.

As expected, this is consistent with the

"certainty effect" found in case one.
A comparison of case one and case two shows a
significant difference (at the .01 level) in subject
preference between these cases in the current study (see
Table 4.7).

This difference may be explained by a dilution

of the "pseudocertainty effect" of case two as a result of
the case two respondent group being a combination of both
sequential and standard type formulators.

However, a review

of Table 4.6 shows that, for both cases one and two,
subjects' preferences for the certain alternative was
significantly greater than their preference for the higher
expected value alternative.
Case 3.

Case three gives subjects the same information

that was available in case two, but presents it in
preintegrated form.

That is, the subjects have no choice

between sequential or standard formulation of information.
Thus, subjects must choose between two risky alternatives
and are expected to maximize their utility (i.e., neither
certainty nor pseudocertainty is expected to be perceived).
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Forty-three percent of the subjects in the current
study chose the option with a $40,000 (20% x $200,000)
expected value, and 57% chose the option with a $37,500 (25%
X 150,000) expected value.

This is significantly different

(at the .01 level) from the findings of prior research (see
Table 4.7).

If subjects behaved according to expected

utility theory, they would have calculated the expected
values of the two options and would have chosen the higher
value option (i.e., the $40,000 option).

Since subjects did

not behave in total accordance with expected utility theory
(see Table 4.7), they might have focused on the absolute
dollar amounts or the probabilities associated with each
option.

A focus on the dollar amounts of the options would

lead subjects to select the option with the higher absolute
dollar amount (i.e., the $200,000 option).
did not prefer that option.

Again, subjects

Thus, a significant number of

subjects appear to have focused on the probabilities of the
options and, accordingly, chose the option with the greatest
probability of payoff (i.e., the 25% option).

This

interpretation implies that the dollar amounts ($150,000
versus $200,000) were viewed as roughly equivalent.
The results of cases two and three in the current study
are of further interest when their preferences are compared.
By presenting the same contingency information to subjects
in preintegrated (case three) or non-preintegrated (case
two) form, subject preference between alternatives is
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altered.

The results of case three are more in the

direction of expected utility results than those of case two
(see Table 4.6).

However, this shift may have resulted from

an inappropriate focus on the magnitude of the
probabilities, rather than rational decision making.
Subject preferences in these two cases are significantly
different (see Table 4.7).

That is, subjects' preferences

were altered by presenting contingency information in
preintegrated versus non-preintegrated form.
Hvpothesis 1 Summary.

The results of each case used to

test hypothesis one refute expected utility theory and
reject the null hypothesis at the .005 level of
significance.

A review of individual case results shows

that subjects did not respond coherently to the individual
decision problems.

Furthermore, the difference in subject

preferences between cases two and three lends support to
prospect theory's contention that the framing of
contingencies affects decision making.

Subject responses to

cases two and three provide evidence of inconsistent
decision making behavior, a violation of rationality.
HYPOTHESIS 2
H2: subjects will not alter their decision preferences
between different frames of the same outcome of a
resource allocation problem.
Like hypothesis one, the null form of hypothesis two is
based on expected utility theory.

The current study uses

cases four and five to test this hypothesis.

The four
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alternatives available in cases four and five all have
identical expected values.

Therefore, subjects should

perceive no difference between the options of the individual
cases.

Furthermore, subjects should respond similarly in

their decision preferences between cases.
Prospect theory offers an alternative hypothesis.
According to prospect theory, decision preferences will
change among alternatives as a result of changing the
reference point regarding the outcome present in a decision
problem.

The theory predicts risk seeking preferences in

situations framed as a loss and risk averse preferences in
situations framed as a gain.

In contrast to expected

utility theory, therefore, there should be a significant
difference between case four's preferred alternative and
case 5's preferred alternative.
Case 4.

As just mentioned, the expected utilities of

the two alternatives of case four are objectively identical.
However, the first alternative is presented as a guaranteed
saving of jobs whereas the second alternative is presented
as a probable saving of jobs.

If subjects are "rational"

decision makers as described by expected utility theory,
they should be indifferent between the two alternatives.

If

subjects behave as predicted by prospect theory they should
be risk averse and prefer the certainty of the first
alternative over the probability of the second.

Table 4.8

shows that subjects did have a significant preference
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between alternatives.

Subjects of the current study

violated expected utility theory and supported prospect

TABLE 4.8
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CASES FOUR AND FIVE
BASED ON CHI-SQUARE
Comparison to Expected Utility Theory
Test
Significance
Case
Statistic
Level
4
48.02
.005
5
.19
**
Comparison Between Current Study Cases
Test
Significance
Cases
Statistic
Level
4-5
12.16
.005
Comparison of Current Study to Prior Research—
Test
Significance
Case
Statistic
Level
4
3.55
.100
5
69.38
.005
*Tversky & Kahneman [K&T, 1979 & T&K, 1981]
results represent the expected frequencies for
comparison to those observed in current study.
** Not significant.

theory by showing a preference for the "certain" alternative
rather than indifference between the two alternatives.
Rather than 50% of the subjects preferring one of the two
alternatives and the remaining 50% preferring the other, 79%
of the subjects of the current study preferred the
alternative framed as a guarantee of saving jobs, which is
evidence of risk averse behavior in a gain-frame scenario.
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This deviation from expected utility theory is significant
at the 0.005 level.
Case 5.

Case five presents information objectively

identical to the information in case four.

However, the

first alternative is presented as a guaranteed loss of jobs
whereas the second alternative is presented as a probable
loss of jobs.

That is, the decision alternatives are framed

as losses, rather than gains (as in case 4).

If subj ects

are "rational" decision makers as described by expected
utility theory, they should be indifferent between the two
alternatives.

If subjects behave as predicted by prospect

theory, they should be risk seeking and prefer the probable
loss of the second alternative over the certain loss of the
first.
Fifty-two percent of the subjects in the current study
preferred the certain loss of the first alternative, and
forty-eight percent of the subjects preferred the probable
loss of jobs offered by the second alternative.

Although

there is a significant difference between cases four and
five, these percentages are not entirely in agreement with
the results suggested by prospect theory.

Rather they tend

to agree with results dictated by expected utility theory
(see Table 4.8).

One possible explanation for the

significant difference between subject response to case five
and Tversky and Kahneman's prior research results is the
emotional impact of the issue presented.

The subjects in
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that prior research were faced with loss of human lives and
were more risk seeking (perhaps optimistic for the loss of
no lives).

Subjects in the current study seemed to accept

the loss of some jobs and chose to minimize potential loss
of jobs rather than gamble on losing all jobs.
Hypothesis 2 Summary.

In summary, case five, viewed

alone, cannot refute expected utility theory and hypothesis
two.

However, case four provides evidence of incoherent

decision making behavior.

While the results of the two

cases discussed above are interesting in and of themselves,
hypothesis two is tested best by comparing the Subjects'
preferences for the alternatives of the two cases.

When

objectively identical information was presented in a gain
frame as in case 4, 79% of the subjects preferred the
alternative offering certainty.

When the information was

presented in a loss frame as in case 5, only 52% of the
subjects preferred the alternative offering certainty.

The

direction of this shift in risk preference is consistent
with prospect theory.

As shown in Table 4.8, the preference

difference is significant.

Thus, there is evidence of

preference reversal among alternatives of objectively
identical problems framed differently, and hypothesis two is
rejected.

Moreover, this is additional evidence of

inconsistent (i.e., irrational) decision making behavior.
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HYPOTHESIS 3
H3: subjects will choose the alternative which
maximizes expected utility.
Expected utility theory requires that rational decision
makers choose the alternative of higher expected value and
be indifferent between alternatives of equal expected value.
By reviewing cases one through five, it is evident that
subjects of the current study violated expected utility
theory by choosing alternatives with lower expected values
(as discussed above) and by changing preference between
alternatives of equal expected value framed as gains rather
than losses.

Thus, hypothesis three is rejected, and

subjects of the current study cannot be viewed as rational
by the standards of expected utility theory.
SELECTION PROCEDURE AND THE HYPOTHESES
Governmental budgeting literature suggests that elected
officials may behave differently from appointed officials.?
Thus, a separate analysis of the behaviors of these two
subject groups seemed warranted.

Survey results were

analyzed to determine whether elected subjects responded in
any significantly different ways than appointed subjects
responded.
Chi-square comparisons of the response frequencies of
subjects who indicated they were elected to those of
subjects who indicated they were appointed to their current
?See Cornia and Usher [1981], for example.
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governmental positions show significant differences for two
of the five cases.

With regard to case two, both subject

groups exhibited preferences consistent with the preferences
described by prospect theory.

However, the appointed

sub]ects exhibited stronger preferences in that direction
(70% of the elected and 81% of the appointed chose the lower
expected value alternative).®
With regard to case three, the two subject groups
exhibited preferences in opposite directions from one
another.

Based on expected utility theory, elected subjects

behaved more irrationally than appointed subjects by
preferring the alternative of lower expected value (75%
chose $37,500).

Appointed subjects behaved more in

accordance with expected utility theory inasmuch as
significantly less of the appointed subjects preferred the
alternative of lower expected value (45% chose $37,500).
However, appointed subjects (like elected subjects) behaved
incoherently by not exhibiting a significant preference for
the alternative of higher expected value.
Personal Interviews
The three research hypotheses tested by the survey are
based on contentions of the well accepted expected utility
theory with regard to decision making under uncertainty.

®Appointee responses were significantly stronger than
the overall subject group responses at the 0.10 significance
level.
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However, the survey cases were designed to test for
violations of expected utility theory as described in
prospect theory literature.

As a means of assessing the

applicability of the type (form) of decision problems
incorporated in the survey's test cases, personal interviews
of small government officials within the Baton Rouge area
were conducted.

The primary focus of the interviews,

regarding prospect theory, was on the theory's explanations
for inconsistent responses in terms of risk averse and risk
seeking tendencies of individuals perceiving situations from
different points of reference.

An objective of the

interviews was to determine whether or not local
governmental unit budgeting personnel (or officials)
perceive part of their job to include decision making under
uncertainty.

Assuming that decision making under

uncertainty is perceived to be a part of the budget process,
an additional objective of the interviews was to assess the
evaluation of gains and losses in allocating resources
throughout the governmental unit.®

The interview format and

examples of the responses follow the description of the
interviewees (participants) below.
Twelve individuals agreed to participate in the
interviewing process.

All of the participants are

®Prospect theory predicts risk averse behavior when
individuals are confronted with an evaluation of gains and
risk seeking behavior when individuals are confronted with
an evaluation of losses.
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associated with small local governments, which serve
populations of less than 10,000 people, surrounding the
Louisiana State University (LSU) area.

The smallest and

largest governmental units represented by the participants
serve populations of 800 and 8000, respectively.

All of the

participants have budget preparation responsibilities within
their governmental unit, and most had over five years of
experience.

The official titles of individuals interviewed

varied, but included the titles of clerk, financial
director, treasurer, manager, and mayor.

Regardless of

title, each interviewee indicated that the legislative
council seeks the interviewee's input in the budgeting
process.
Format.

In an effort to maintain some uniformity

across the individual interviews, each interview began by
following a standard format.

First, the interviewer

introduced herself as an accounting doctoral student at LSU,
and identified her dissertation interests to be in the
budgeting process and decision making needs of small
governmental units.

Then, the interviewer explained the

objective of the interview to be obtaining insight into the
actual budgeting environment faced by individuals
responsible for budget preparation in small governmental
units.

Participants were told that they were helping the

interviewer design a meaningful survey, providing
information not currently available in the literature, and
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helping to increase the quality of research focusing on
small governmental units.

Once participants were informed

of their role, they were asked to respond to each of three
questions :
1. What are some of the major constraints faced in
serving the public?;
2. Can you recall a resource allocation decision
having to be made between alternatives with expected
positive outcomes but some degree of uncertainty
regarding those outcomes?; and
3. Can you recall a resource allocation decision
having to be made between alternatives with expected
negative outcomes but some degree of uncertainty
regarding those outcomes?
To aid in answering the last two questions, the interviewer
provided two examples of each type (i.e., positive and
negative) of decision.

Responses to the three questions as

well as general input from the participants are discussed
below.
Interviewee Input.

None of the interviewees hesitated

in responding to the first question.

All of them stated

that there is a great deal of time pressure associated with
the budgeting process.

In order to meet the budgeting

schedule, most participants expressed feeling time pressure
in gathering information.

In addition, each of the

interviewees identified money to be a major budgeting
constraint, and all made similar comments about there never
being enough money to satisfy all of their constituents.
Each interviewee mentioned that cuts in state and federal
funding have had a significant impact on the budgeting
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process.

Their governmental units have recently been forced

to cut back in providing services or raise tax revenues.
Suprisingly, one community recently passed a $0,005 sales
tax with a 93% yes vote of the public.

The interviewee

associated with that community claims the sales tax success
to be a result of "informing the people."
The second and third questions asked of the
participants were asked together, and examples of each were
provided to help trigger memories of similar situations
participants had experienced in their current positions (see
appendix B for the examples used during the interview
process).

Because the questions are identical, except for

the gain or loss perspectives, responses to these questions
are discussed simultaneously.
With the limited time alloted to the interview, most
interviewees could only address one of the two questions, or
an unresolved issue which ultimately may be perceived as
either negative or positive.

The participants had a

tendency to recall a single situation of uncertainty and
devote the entire interview to that issue.
One example of responses to the last two questions is
the description of one governmental unit's laying off of
one-fourth of their existing firemen.

The interviewee

explained the issue in terms of saving the taxpayers money.
As long as the proposed volunteer firemen program could
provide adequate coverage to replace the laid off firemen.
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the government's fire ratings were not expected to change
except, perhaps, positively.

That meant the government

could save approximately $200,000 per year of the taxpayers'
money because there would be a lower total salary figure for
the fire department without an increased amount of fire
insurance required for the government.

Alternatively, the

program could have been viewed as costing the government.
The government could have perceived a sure cost of $200,000
per year in firemen salaries by retaining the firemen.

The

alternative could have been perceived as a probability of
lower costs which might result by successfully replacing
one-fourth of their firemen with volunteers, and a
probability for higher costs if the volunteer program is
unsuccessful, insurance costs increase and the firemen must
be replaced.
When asked about the alternative view, the participant
stressed that the government was sure the volunteer program
would work and that it was highly likely that their fire
rating would improve and there would be no increase in
insurance costs to be born by the taxpayers.
of interviews, a pattern seemed apparent.

After a number

It seemed that

interviewees always presented and discussed situations in
gain frame and near or absolute certainty terms when they
were recalling a situation where the decision had already
been made and the governmental unit was committed to that
decision.

This is an area for future research.

However,
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for purposes of this study it must be noted that
interviewees describing budgeting decision making situations
of apparent uncertainty (as to outcome) could not express
degrees of uncertainty or probabilities of alternative
outcomes.

They supported their decision as positive and

most certain.
Two recurring issues among interviewees were
electricity and water treatment (and sewer).

None of the

interviewees who discussed these topics had made any
decision as of the interview date, but were in the process
of weighing alternatives.

Discussions of two of the

participants are summarized below.
The electricity issue was one of the decision problem
situations that a number of the participants were in the
process of solving.

To summarize the issues, the

governmental units were weighing the following alternatives:
(1) contract for electrical service with private companies,
or (2) become a member of (or maintain membership in) a
utility co-op.

The private companies were offering

competitive rates, but no long-term guarantees.

The co-op

offers competitive rates and gives member units some control
through member representation on the co-op board of
directors.

Most participants describing this issue and its

alternatives saw all options to be relatively equivalent in

l^These discussions are fairly representative of the
interviewees who discussed these issues.
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the short-run.

However, when considering the long-run, the

co-op alternative was described as guaranteeing reasonable
rates into the future.

The private companies were described

as being more uncertain.

There was a probability that the

private companies could provide the additional savings they
alluded to in negotiations, but there was also a probability
that the private companies would increase their rates and
provide no additional savings (or perhaps no savings at all)
beyond those of the co-op.

Participants indicated that they

had sought expert advise regarding the options; however,
they did not trust that advise beyond a five year horizon.
Although the legislative councils of the governmental
units involved had not voted on the issue, the participants
expressed their opinions on the alternatives.

In every

instance, the participant felt the co-op would provide the
highest degree of certainty as a result of the
representation on the board, and preferred that alternative.
Even though there was a probability that the private
companies could offer substantial additional savings in the
long-run, the participants also perceived a high probability
of no such savings.
The second unresolved issue discussed by many of the
participants was the issue of water and sewer treatment.
example of the decision problem is the situation described
below, which is currently being addressed by one of the
interviewees.

The example government is relying on the
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expert opinion of an engineering firm in the weighing of
alternatives.
The decision problem to be solved is the satisfaction
of Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.) requirements
regarding the government's current sewer system.

The

governmental unit perceives no choice as to whether or not
to improve the system because the penalties associated with
noncompliance are sufficiently high to prohibit
noncompliance.

Thus, the decision problem is how to improve

the system.

Four courses of action (alternatives) are being

considered.

The first alternative is to upgrade the

existing system, which would guarantee satisfaction of the
(

existing requirements.

However, this alternative would not

satisfy more stringent requirements proposed by the state.
The second alternative would be an upgrade like the first
alternative, but would include additional filters.

This has

a high probability of consistently meeting the state's more
stringent proposed requirements.

The third alternative

would abandon the existing system for a new plant, which
guarantees to meet the proposed more stringent requirements.
The fourth alternative also abandons the existing system and
requires the construction of a plant on or near the river,
where the E.P.A. and state apply less stringent
requirements.

The costs per alternative increase from

$450,000 for alternative one to $1.2 million for alternative
four.
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The governmental unit was not focusing on the immediate
costs of the alternatives.

Rather it was concerned with

meeting E.P.A. standards for the longest period of time.
The engineering firm emphasized that requirements for
systems other than those discharging into the river have
become more stringent over time.

Moreover, the experts

suggest that the probability is high that the trend for
increasing stringency will continue.

Thus, it is expected

that the preferred alternative will be alternative four,
which provides the highest probability of satisfying all
requirements into the future.

All of the alternatives would

satisfy current requirements.

Alternatives three and four

would satisfy the proposed requirements.

However, only

alternative four offers some assurance of satisfying future
requirement levels.
Summary of Insights.

Although the interview process

was limited to interviews of small governmental unit
officials (personnel) within one specific area of the United
States, the process served to provide additional insight
(beyond that obtained by the mail survey) regarding the
resource allocation decision making environment of small
governments.

Each of the interviewees confirmed the idea

that time pressure and limited funds make budgeting a
challenge.

Even though expert advise regarding specific

decision problems is often available, many of the
participants indicated that their government often does not
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have the time or money to seek the advise.

Participants who

indicated that their government had contracted for expert
advise also suggested that they tended to alter the
probabilities experts express regarding alternative courses
of action for a decision problem.
The interviews also confirmed the idea that the
constituency of small local governments seem to be more
aware of (concerned with) the actions of their governments.
With regard to the actions of the governmental units, the
interviews assessed the applicability of case decision
problems (similar to those used on the mail survey) within
the resource allocation process.

The interviewees expressed

no trouble relating to the example cases used to start the
discussion of uncertainty in budgeting (see appendix B).
However, most participants experienced difficulty in
recalling the perceived probabilities of alternatives
associated with decisions that already had been made.

In

discussions of uncertain outcomes, participants attached
certainty (or near certainty) to the alternative course of
action chosen, and presented the issue in a gain frame.

The

selection of the certain gain is in accordance with prospect
theory; however, the fact that the decision had already been
made and the government was committed to a particular course
of action seemed to affect the presentation of the issue.
This is an area for future research.
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The interviews of participants who were in the process
of evaluating alternatives of a decision problem also
suggested a tendency to employ a gain frame in their
presentation of the alternatives.

Again, the participants

evaluating the alternatives from a gain reference point
indicated preferences for the most certain outcome
alternative (even when the expected value of costs was
higher).

One interesting observation was that participants

used a gain frame almost exclusively.

An interesting follow

up study would be to determine which alternative was
ultimately selected, how that selection is rationalized by
the governmental unit, and how the other alternatives are
perceived once the choice has been made.
Summary
This chapter presented the results and analysis of the
mail survey used to investigate local governmental decision
making behavior in situations of uncertainty.

In addition,

the chapter presented a summary of personal interview
findings with regard to the budgeting environment of small
local governments and their resource allocation decision
problems-

As suggested in previous chapters, prospect

theory rather than the well accepted expected utility theory
was found to be more descriptive of respondents' behavior in
decision situations of uncertainty.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY OF THE STUDY
The purposes of this chapter are to (1) provide a brief
summary of the research study which was undertaken,

(2)

discuss the implications of the results of the study in the
context of the current body of literature in the areas of
small local government resource allocation and decision
making under uncertainty,

(3) discuss the limitations of the

study, and (4) discuss the implications of this study for
future research.
Summary of Studv
A behavioral study was conducted to examine the
decision making behavior of individuals responsible for
resource allocation (budget preparation) within small local
governmental units.

Six hundred governmental units, serving

no more than 10,000 people each, were randomly selected from
the 1987 directory of United States government names and
addresses, which is published by the Census Bureau.
Approximately 47% of these governments returned usable
replies.

The budget preparer of each government received a

survey consisting of two short cases.

Each case was

designed to represent a resource allocation decision making
problem under conditions of uncertainty.
focused on employee lay offs.

O ',

1 the

cases

Each subject received this

case in the form of either a gain or a loss frame.

The

other case focused on federal funding for capital
135
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improvements.

Each subject received one of three possible

federal funding cases.

All three of the cases were

presented in a gain frame, and were designed to detect the
certainty and pseudocertainty effects.

All five cases used

in the study were designed to detect risk averse and risk
seeking tendencies within the population of small local
government resource allocators.
Two independent variables were used in the experimental
design.

The first independent variable was the frame of the

decision problem outcome.

Half of the subjects received the

employee lay off decision problem with the two alternative
courses of action framed as gains.

The other half received

the same decision problem with the two alternatives framed
as losses.

The second independent variable was the frame of

the decision problem contingency.

One-third of the subjects

received the federal funding decision problem framed as a
one-stage decision problem with one certain alternative and
one probable alternative of higher expected value.

A second

one-third of the subjects received the federal funding
decision problem framed as a two-stage decision problem,
where the chance of reaching the second stage was 25% and
there is no pay off unless the second stage is reached.
Once at the second stage, the decision problem presents one
certain alternative and one probable alternative of higher
expected value.

The remaining one-third of the subjects

received the two-stage federal funding decision problem in
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preintegrated form.

That is, the 25% chance of reaching the

second stage was incorporated into the alternatives so that
the subjects' decision was made between two probable
payoffs.

The experimental design described above is

illustrated in Table 5.1.

TABLE 5.1
SUMMARY OF THE INDIVIDUAL TREATMENTS
INCLUDED IN THE STUDY
Frame of Federal Funding Contingency
Frame of
Employee
Lav offs

One-stage
certainty
alternative

Two-stage
certainty
alternative

One-stage
probable
alternatives

Gain
Outcome

A

B

C

Loss
Outcome

D

E

F

The research question examined in the course of the
study was concerned with the effect of presentation (or
framing) of decision problem alternatives on the rational
choice behavior of budget preparers representing small local
governmental units.

Three statistically testable hypotheses

were formulated to address the research question.

The

hypotheses (expressed in their null forms) were as follows:
HI:

The budget manager will not alter his decision
preferences between different frames of the same
contingency.

H2:

The budget manager will not alter his decision
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preferences between different frames of the same
outcome.
H3 :

The budget manager will choose the alternative
which maximizes expected utility.

Hypothesis one was rejected by the data.

The results

for each of the three cases indicate incoherent decision
behavior.

In addition, a comparison of responses to cases

two and three indicates inconsistent decision behavior.

The

results support prospect theory's contention that decision
makers react differently to information presented in
preintegrated form than they do to the same information
presented in non-pre integrated form, where one of the
decision alternatives may be perceived as being certain.
Table 4.7 summarizes the results of the three cases used to
test hypothesis one.
Hypothesis two was rejected by a comparison of
responses to two objectively identical cases framed
differently as to outcomes.

As Table 4.8 shows, subjects

exhibited a significant preference for the alternative
offering certainty when the decision problem and
alternatives were presented in a gain frame (case 4) rather
than in a loss frame (case 5).

When the alternatives were

framed as losses, the preference for the certain alternative
was significantly diluted.

Because each alternative of the

two cases (that is, each of the four alternatives) was
objectively identical, subjects' preference for one
alternative over the other was incoherent behavior and in
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violation of expected utility theory.

Moreover, the shift

in risk preference between case four and case five is
evidence of inconsistent decision making behavior, which is
also considered a violation of expected utility theory.
Hypothesis three was also rejected.

Table 5.2

summarizes the subjects' preferences by case in terms of the
expected value of the case alternatives.

Subjects not only

preferred alternatives of lower expected value, but also
changed preferences (i.e., were not indifferent) between
alternatives of equal expected value framed as gains rather
than losses.

These results are in violation of expected

utility theory and its definition of rational decision
behavior under conditions of uncertainty.
TABLE 5.2
CASE RESULTS OF CURRENT STUDY IN TERMS OF
CASE ALTERNATIVE EXPECTED VALUE
Alternative
Expected
Value

Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5

Higher

13%

24%

43%

n/a

n/a

Lower

87%

76%

57%

n/a

n/a

79%

52%

21%

48%

Equal

n/a

n/a

n/a _
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Implications of the Results of the Study
Previous research in two primary areas served as a
basis for the study.

Of general interest was work

addressing characteristics of local governmental units.
However, work of primary interest to the study was that
focusing on the budgeting environment of local governmental
units, especially the early decision making stage of the
resource allocation process.

Empirical research in both of

these areas was sparse, with most findings based on case
studies of single governmental units or small groups of
units.

Budgeting studies have tended to emphasize the

results of the budgeting process, while tending to ignore
the decision making process.

The call for research into the

decision making process of local governmental units had been
made and acknowledged.

Yet, the call had not been answered

by empirical work with small governments prior to this
study.
Although researchers have paid minimal attention to
small local governments or the resource allocation
activities of local governments, previous research did
provide a basis for this study.

The current study can be

linked to previous research in several ways.

As discussed

in chapter two, earlier research noted (1) the important
role of local governments as the primary provider of
domestic services; (2) the constraints on small local
governments imposed by limited resources; (3) local
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government budgeters' focus on risk and their reliance on
nonquant itat ive risk analysis procedures; and (4) an
increasingly critical citizenry monitoring local governments
more closely.

The first and last issues were not

questioned, but considered givens for the current research.
Those issues provided a very basic impetus for the focus on
small local governments.

The second and third issues were

addressed, to some extent, by the survey and the interview
process of this study.
The interviews with small local government budgeting
personnel support the findings of prior case studies
regarding limited resources (both human and monetary).

All

interviewees suggested that there is never enough money to
satisfy everyone in the community.

They expressed a sense

of pressure associated with the allocation of limited
monetary resources to seemingly endless requests.

Previous

findings with regard to human constraints (or limited human
resources) can be tied into the issue of allocating limited
monetary resources among the constituency.

Although small

local governments have a legislative council which approves
the budget, a single budget preparer often dominates the
entire budget process.1

The current study supports the

contentions of prior research that professional budget
officers are rare among small local governments.

Only 19%

of the governmental units of this study employed a full-time
^See Sokolow and Honadle [1984] and Cothran [1986].
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budget officer.

As suggested in the literature, 44% of the

budget preparers responding to the current study were clerks
and the majority of those clerks (52%) were elected.
Selection method (elected or appointed) had been
suggested to be a potential cause of different decision
making behavior within the population of local government
resource allocators.

This study has provided some empirical

support for the contention that differences exist in
decision making behavior of elected versus appointed budget
preparers.

Table 4.4 shows that only 42% of the budget

preparers responding to this study were elected to their
positions.
By comparing the case alternative preferences of
elected and appointed budget preparers, this study detected
only two differences in decision making behavior between the
two groups.

First, appointed preparers exhibited a stronger

preference for the alternative associated with pseudo
certainty in the two-stage federal funding decision problem
(case two).

However, both groups preferred that same

alternative, which was associated with the lower expected
value.2

Second, given two probable alternatives (e.g., the

preintegrated form of the federal funding problem as
presented in case three), significantly more of the
appointed preparers chose the alternative of higher risk and
^Appointee responses were significantly stronger than
the overall subject group responses at the 0.1 significance
level.
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higher expected value.

However, according to expected

utility theory, both groups of preparers exhibited
irrational decision behavior by preferring the alternatives
of lower expected value.
This behavior lends support to the contentions of
prospect theory.

That is, this study suggests that the

decision behavior of both elected and appointed resource
allocators of small local governments supports prospect
theory literature.

As expected, the preferred decision

alternative for the survey decision problems framed as gains
was the alternative of perceived certainty.

Insight

obtained from the personal interviews is used below to
expand on this finding with regard to small local government
budget preparer decision behavior.
Budget preparers interviewed during this study
presented decision problems in a gain frame, and supported
the alternative expressed as certainty with regard to the
perceived critical aspect of the decision problem.

Of the

twelve subjects participating in the interviews, none of
them could recall a decision problem (within the limited
time of the interview) in a negative (or loss) frame.

It is

possible that previous research findings together with this
study's interviews provide an explanation for the surveyed
subjects' somewhat unexpected rational behavior in response
to the single decision problem (case five) presented in a
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loss frame.3

It appears that small government resource

allocators operate in an environment where it is more
comfortable to structure resource allocation decision
problems in terms of gains.
When facing a choice between a sure gain and a
potentially higher gain, political and social pressures
might deter resource allocators from passing up a sure gain.
They may anticipate difficulty in justifying their decision
should the higher (yet riskier) gain never reach fruition.
When perceiving a choice between a sure loss and a
potentially higher loss, surveyed resource allocators
exhibited behavior that was in more accordance with expected
utility theory.

However, only one survey case presented a

decision problem in a loss frame.
This study has provided an empirical foundation for
future research.

Insights from the interviews indicate that

small local government officials do face decision problems
accompanied by uncertain outcomes when addressing the
budgeting of scarce resources.

The results of the random

sampling of small local governments surveyed demonstrates
that these decision makers cannot be assumed to react
rationally (in terms of expected utility theory) to decision
^Unlike the results of case four (gain frame), the
results of case five (loss frame) indicate that subjects
were indifferent between the two objectively identical
alternatives (52% preferred the certain alternative and 483
preferred the risky alternative). See Bazerman [1984] and
Puto [1985] for a discussion of subjects framing actual
decision problems faced within their environment.
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problems under conditions of uncertainty.

The reaction of

these small governments' budgeting personnel to varied
frames (or presentations) of objectively identical
information could be explained in terms of prospect theory.
This issue of "rational" decision making within the resource
allocation process served as the motivation for the current
study.

These findings provide the foundation for extended

research on the budgeting systems of small local
governments, and a few of those extensions are briefly
described in the last section of this chapter.
Limitations of the Studv
As previously indicated, this study was the first one
to address the early stage of decision making in the
resource allocation process of budgeting within small local
governmental units.

The study's findings should be

generalizable as a result of using actual budgeting
personnel, those with the responsibility of identifying and
compiling information for the budgeting process.

However,

the limitations of any behavioral experiment threaten this
study's validity.
Readers should note that this study and its findings
are based on responses to structured cases, which may not be
representative of the subject's actual decision making
environment.

Further research is necessary to determine

whether similar results can be associated with subjects
operating within their natural budgetary decision making
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environment in the absence of such structured cases.

Hypo

thetical decision problems were abstracted from their
realistic environment in an attempt to reduce experimental
noise.

As a result of this abstraction, experimentally

manipulated differences are likely to stand out more
noticeably within the decision problem than they would in a
real setting.

Therefore, this study's results may not be

found in a more realistic setting.

Alternatively, failure

to control experimental noise is likely to produce at least
equally misleading conclusions resulting from camouflaging
and biasing effects of
It was reassuring

the noise.
(to some extent) to find situations

of uncertainty existing in the interviewed subjects'
resource allocation environment.
subj ects typically did

Although interviewed

not perceive dichotomousalternatives

(as provided by the survey

decision

problems), they did

perceive a limited number of alternatives.

Moreover, they

relied on their own assessment or that of an expert to
assign some degree of risk (or certainty) to each
alternative (regarding the critical aspect of the decision
problem).
The abstraction of decision problems necessary to
survey the 600 unique small local governmental units
comprising the random sample are associated with another
potential limitation.

Subjects were asked to role play when

scenarios (employment or federal funding levels) were not
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representative of the subject's environment.

To the extent

that subjects required to role play could not project
themselves into the scenario, the meaningfulness of the
study's results may be questioned.*
While considering the subjects' reaction to abstract
decision problems and their legitimate response to the
cases, it is interesting to note that at least one subject
indicated that he consciously considered the payoffs and
perceived risks associated with each alternative (the
amounts and probabilities were underscored by the subject).
This subject reacted in accordance with prospect theory.
This provides some assurance that the behavior of subjects,
in gereral, was not caused by an inability to deal with the
abstract nature of the cases or a refusal to consider the
salient points presented.
The third limitation results from using a mail survey
to collect data from the population of small governmental
units.

Although the sample was random and survey versions

(manipulations) were randomly assigned, the sample's
response rate was less than 100% and the sample size varied
among survey versions.

The study's response rate was

^ The average number of employees for surveyed subjects
was 27. The case scenario based on employee lay offs
identified 60 jobs at risk with 20 guaranteed to be saved
(40 lost) or chances of saving (losing) all or none of the
60 jobs. Average levels of 1987 federal funding was
$432,807. The federal funding case scenario used
alternatives of perceived certainty and risk associated with
payoffs of $150,000 and $200,000. See Table 4.1 for
summarized case scenarios.
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approximately 50%.

Therefore, the findings of the study

should not be generalized to the population of small local
governmental units' budgeting officials without noting that
approximately half of the budgeting officials sampled did
not respond.

There is no reason to expect the

nonrespondents to differ significantly from the respondents.
A chi-square test indicated no significant differences
between results of the first mailing and results of the
second mailing.

However, the potential for nonresponse- bias

does exist.
As discussed earlier, the study used five cases to
address the research question.

Only one of those cases was

framed from a loss (or negative) perspective.

Cases one

through three were alternative framings of contingencies,
and were each presented in a gain scenario.

It should be

noted that the results may be different when subjects are
presented with framing of contingency problems in a loss
context.

While response to the single loss-frame case (case

five) contributed to findings of inconsistent decision
preference with regard to risk, responses were not entirely
consistent with prospect theory.

While there was a

significant shift in the direction predicted by prospect
theory, subjects did not exhibit risk seeking tendencies
when faced with that loss frame decision problem.
Furthermore, interviewed subjects did not readily recall or
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discuss negative decision scenarios from their governmental
experience.
Suggestions for Future Research
The limitations discussed above suggest several
extensions to this study that might be undertaken.

The

current study did not employ a loss scenario in the framing
of contingencies.

One extension of this study should

incorporate a loss scenario into the research design so that
small government budgeting officials' decision behavior can
be analyzed and compared to the gain scenario decision
behavior of this study.

Results of the survey, as well as

the interviews, suggest a need for further investigation of
the subjects' apparent fixation on gain frames.
The reliance on abstract cases which present specific
payoffs and probabilities of payoffs was also mentioned in
the limitations to this study.

Another extension of the

study might focus on this issue by varying payoffs and
probabilities.

Kahneman and Tversky [1979] suggest the need

for such an extension in their discussion of decision
makers' threshold sensitivity levels with regard to payoffs
and probabilities.

For example, decision makers may react

more strongly to a one percent change in probability when
the change is from one to zero percent than when the change
is from two to one percent.
The study surveyed budget preparers, or individuals
responsible for the compilation and presentation of
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information ultimately to be included in the budget
deliberations with the local government's legislative
council.

Future research could include a replication of

this study employing as subjects members of the small local
government's legislative council.

Such a study could

provide insight into the effects of presentation framing on
the budget deliberations of the council and the budgeting
officials.

Public administration literature suggests that

presentation leads to deliberations and deliberations
produce results.
Each of these extensions are seemingly worthy of future
research effort; however, the following extension is
considered the most direct extension of practical
significance to the population of small local governments.
This extension is into the area of budgeting system
development.

Kahneman and Tversky [1979] claim that

departures from expected utility theory (with regard to
preference) can be corrected by decision makers once they
realize preferences are inconsistent, intransitive or
inadmissable.

Awareness of the impact of framing (as found

in the current study) should be used to improve'resource
allocation decisions.5

^Northcraft and Neale [1986] have done work in this
area. Their work might prove helpful in future research
devoted to the development of more comprehensive (perhaps
frame neutral) budget planning systems.
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Budget preparers could be trained to detect framing
differences and edit the decision problem in such a way that
prevents framing from having a significant influence over
resource allocation.

Once such a training program has been

developed and tested, its implementation could result in
more efficient resource allocations and confidence among
budget preparers.

That is, budget preparers should be more

confident that they are choosing among resource allocation
alternatives based on objective differences of significance
to the community, rather than on manipulated perspectives of
the decision problem.

For example, this study suggests that

budget preparers of small local governments are more
comfortable with gain scenarios than loss scenarios, and
prefer certain gains over risky gains.

An effective

training program could emphasize this tendency among small
government budget preparers and show how decision preference
manipulation might occur as a result of the presenter's
widening or narrowing the decision problem perspective to
achieve the intended decision frame.

The guidance in

decision making under uncertainty which could be offered by
a training program would help budget preparers defend their
actions (decisions) to their constituents and ease some of
the pressure currently associated with the decision making
process of resource allocation in small local governments.
Improved decision making in the resource allocation
process should have significant practical implications for
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individuals involved with the budgeting process of small
local governments, including constituents as well as
budgeting personnel.

Constituents will likely continue to

scrutinize the work of their governments and demand the most
efficient and effective allocation of their resources.
Small local governments which are aware of the impact of
framing would have the opportunity of assessing the
rationality of their own behavior throughout the budgeting
process.

However, two points in time during the budgeting

process might be most affected by an understanding of
framing:

(1) the initial assessment of the decision problem

and its alternatives, and (2) the justification of decision
choice (or course of action) to the constituents.
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November 18, 1988

'FI'
Dear 'F3':
Small local governmental units similar to yours represent a
significant element in our U.S. governmental system.
Surprisingly, smaller governmental units have not received
the attention of researchers. I am attempting to lay a
foundation for continuing research focusing on the needs of
smaller governmental units across the United States.
Your governmental unit has been randomly selected to
participate in my study. I need your response to make the
results of my random sampling meaningful. I can assure you
that all responses will be kept completely confidential. By
taking approximately ten minutes to read the general
instructions, below, and complete the enclosed survey, you
will be making a significant contribution toward the
successful completion of my degree. More importantly, you
will be helping to expand the focus of governmental research
to include the governmental units which most directly affect
the daily lives of a substantial portion of U.S. citizens —
small local governments.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS. Please read the two short cases
printed on the back of this letter. Each case should be
considered separately. Please consider all decision factors
not explicitly mentioned in the cases to be relatively equal
among the alternatives. After reading each case, please
indicate the course of action you prefer by checking the
blank representing your choice on the accompanying response
form. Also, make sure to complete the demographic questions
presented in the first part of the response form. When
complete, simply staple the form closed and drop it in the
mail.
Sincere thanks.

Karen McKenzie
Ph.D. Candidate, LSU
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December 7, 1988

"FI"
Dear "F3";
A few weeks ago, I sent you a questionnaire regarding your
small local government. I feel small local governmental
units similar to yours represent a significant element in
our U.S. governmental system. Thus, my survey is attempting
to lay a foundation for continuing research focusing on the
needs of smaller governmental units across the United
States. I have already received numerous completed
questionnaires, and if yours was among them, I sincerely
thank you. However, if you have not yet had a chance to
answer the questionnaire, I am enclosing another one in the
hope that you will now have a few minutes to do so.
I have asked a very few governmental units to help me with
this project, so your individual response is extremely
important — in fact, without your help, my project cannot
succeed. Again, I can assure you that all responses will be
kept completely confidential.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS. Please read the two short cases
printed on the back of this letter. Each case should be
considered separately. Please consider all decision factors
not explicitly mentioned in the cases to be relatively equal
among the alternatives. After reading each case, please
indicate the course of action you prefer by checking the
blank representing your choice on the accompanying response
form. Also, make sure to complete the demographic questions
presented in the first part of the response form. When
complete, simply staple the form closed and drop it in the
mail.
Sincere thanks.

Karen McKenzie
Ph.D. Candidate, LSU
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The following cases have been designed to survey local
governments serving from less than 100 to approximately
10,000 people. Therefore, you may find the numbers
unrealistic for your government. It is important that you
project yourself into the case government to respond to the
two cases, and then provide the more realistic numbers for
your governmental unit on the appropriate blanks in the top
portion of the enclosed response form.
CASE I
Research indicates a trend decreasing federal aid and an
increasing demand for total governmental expenditures. Your
budget office projects a need to layoff 60 government
employees. However, two plans to alleviate this need for
layoffs were submitted along with the budget staff's
projection. Which plan would you favor?
Plan A is guaranteed to save 20 employees from the
layoff.
Plan B has a 1/3 probability of saving all employees
from the layoff and a 2/3 probability of saving none of
the employees from the layoff.
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form
and indicate your preference.
CASE II
Without the expertise of a federal aid coordinator, you feel
it is extremely unlikely that your government will secure
any federal funding. Thus, your government has b e ^ n
negotiations to hire a federal aid coordinator to improve
your chances of obtaining federal funding for capital
improvements and special programs. You know that the
applicants for the coordinator position are also negotiating
with other governmental units, and you estimate that you
have a 25% chance of hiring one of the applicants. If you
hire one of the applicants you feel absolutely confident
that the coordinator can secure $150,000 for capital
improvements by focusing all energies on a specific
strategy, and you arc 80% confident that the coordinator can
secure $200,000 by pursuing an alternative strategy.
Preliminary paperwork must be submitted for approval by the
council before the hiring process is expected to be
completed. Which one of the coordinator strategies would
you choose to present to the council?
A:

($150,000)

or

B:

($200,000, .80)

Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form
and indicate your preference.
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The following cases have been designed to survey local
governments serving from less than 100 to approximately
10,000 people. Therefore, you may find the numbers
unrealistic for your government. It is important that you
project yourself into the case government to respond to the
two cases, and then provide the more realistic numbers for
your governmental unit on the appropriate blanks in the top
portion of the enclosed response form.
CASE A
Without the expertise of a federal aid coordinator, you feel
it is extremely unlikely that your government will secure
any federal funding. Thus, your government has begun
negotiations to hire a federal aid coordinator to improve
your chances of obtaining federal funding for capital
improvements and special programs. You know that the
applicants for the coordinator position are also negotiating
with other governmental units, and you estimate that you
have a 25% chance of hiring one of the applicants. If you
hire one of the applicants you feel absolutely confident
that the coordinator can secure $150,000 for capital
improvements by focusing all energies on a specific
strategy, and you are 80% confident that the coordinator can
secure $200,000 by pursuing an alternative strategy.
Preliminary paperwork must be submitted for approval by the
council before the hiring process is expected to be
completed. Which one of the coordinator strategies would
you choose to present to the council?
A:

($150,000)

or

B:

($200,000, .80)

Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form
and indicate your preference.
CASE B
Research indicates a decreasing trend in federal aid and an
increasing demand for total governmental expenditures. Your
budget office projects the need to layoff 60 government
employees. However, two plans to alleviate this need for
layoffs were submitted along with the budget staff's
projection. Which plan would you favor?
Plan C is guaranteed to result in a loss of 40
government employee jobs.
Plan D has a 1/3 probability that no government
employee jobs will be lost and a 2/3 probability that
60 government employee jobs will be lost.
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form
and indicate your preference.
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The following cases have been designed to survey local
governments serving from less than 100 to approximately
10,000 people. Therefore, you may find the numbers
unrealistic for your government. It is important that you
project yourself into the case government to respond to the
two cases, and then provide the more realistic numbers for
your governmental unit on the appropriate blanks in the top
portion of the enclosed response form.
CASE 1
Your government's federal aid coordinator has two strategic
options available for the current period's consideration.
Option Z has a 20% chance of resulting in federal aid of
$200,000. Option Y has a 25% chance of resulting in federal
aid of $150,000. Which option would you encourage the
coordinator to pursue:
Z:

$200,000; .2

or

Y:

$150,000; .25

Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form
and indicate your preference.
CASE 2
Research indicates a decreasing trend in federal aid and an
increasing demand for total governmental expenditures. Your
budget office projects the need to layoff 60 government
employees. However, two plans to alleviate this need for
layoffs were submitted along with the budget staff's
projection. Which plan would you favor?
Plan A is guaranteed to save 20 employees from the
layoff.
Plan B has a 1/3 probability of saving all employees
from the layoff and a 2/3 probability of saving none of
the employees from the layoff.
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form
and indicate your preference.
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The following cases have been designed to survey local
governments serving from less than 100 to approximately
10,000 people^ Therefore, you may find the numbers
unrealistic for your government. It is important that you
project yourself into the case government to respond to the
two cases, and then provide the more realistic numbers for
your governmental unit on the appropriate blanks in the top
portion of the enclosed response form.
CASE X
Research indicates a decreasing trend in federal aid and an
increasing demand for total governmental expenditures. Your
budget office projects the need to layoff 60 government
employees. However, two plans to alleviate this need for
layoffs were submitted along with the budget staff's
projection. Which plan would you favor?
Plan C is guaranteed to result in a loss of 40
government employee jobs.
Plan D has a 1/3 probability that no government
employee jobs will be lost and a 2/3 probability that
60 government employee jobs will be lost.
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form
and indicate your preference.
CASE Y
Your government's federal aid coordinator has two strategic
options available for the current period's consideration.
Option Z has a 20% chance of resulting in federal aid of
$200,000. Option Y has a 25% chance of resulting in federal
aid of $150,000. Which option would you encourage the
coordinator to pursue;
Z:

$200,000; .2

or

Y:

$150,000; .25

Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form
and indicate your preference.
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The following cases have been designed to survey local
governments serving from less than 100 to approximately
10,000 people. Therefore, you may find the numbers
unrealistic for your government. It is important that you
project yourself into the case government to respond to the
two cases, and then provide the more realistic numbers for
your governmental unit on the appropriate blanks in the top
portion of the enclosed response form.
CASE E
Research indicates a trend in decreasing federal aid and an
increasing demand for total governmental expenditures. Your
budget office projects the need to layoff 60 government
employees. However, two plans to alleviate this need for
layoffs were submitted along with the budget staff's
projection. Which plan would you favor?
Plan A is guaranteed to save 20 employees from the
layoff.
Plan B has a 1/3 probability of saving all employees
from the layoff and a 2/3 probability of saving none of
the employees from the layoff.
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form
and indicate your preference.
CASE Z
Which of the following options do you prefer?
A.

a sure receipt of $150,000 in federal funding for
capital improvements

B.

80% chance of receiving $200,000 in federal
funding for capital improvements

Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form
and indicate your preference.
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The following cases have been designed to survey local
governments serving from less than 100 to approximately
10,000 people. Therefore, you may find the numbers
unrealistic for your government. It is important that you
project yourself into the case government to respond to the
two cases, and then provide the more realistic numbers for
your governmental unit on the appropriate blanks in the top
portion of the enclosed response form.
CASE (i)
Which of the following options do you prefer?
A.

a sure receipt of $150,000 in federal funding for
capital improvements

B.

80% chance of receiving $200,000 in federal
funding for capital improvements

Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form
and indicate your preference.
CASE (ii)
Research indicates a decreasing trend in federal aid and an
increasing demand for total governmental expenditures. Your
budget office projects the need to layoff 60 government
employees. However, two plans to alleviate this need for
layoffs were submitted along with the budget staff's
projection. Which plan would you favor?
Plan C is guaranteed to result in a loss of 40
government employee jobs.
Plan D has a 1/3 probability that no government
employee jobs will be lost and a 2/3 probability that
60 government employee jobs will be lost.
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form
and indicate your preference.
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Official title of respondent ___________________________ .
Is this an ___ elected or ___ appointed position?
Educational Background.
Please indicate highest level of education completed:
Level___________

Area of Studv___________

High School
Associates Degree

.
_______________________________ .

Bachelors Degree

.

Masters Degree

.

Professional Experience.
Years in current position
Years of local government budgeting experience

Estimated population of your jurisdiction
Type of local government (check one):
Municipality
__ School district
Township
__ Special district

__ County
Other _

Does your government have a full-time budget officer? __
Yes __ No.
If "yes,” is this an __ elected or __ appointed position?
Number of local government employees __________________ .
1987 federal funding received for capital improvements

5_____________
Please refer to the two independent case scenarios printed
on the back of the letter accompanying this form. For each
case, check the plan or option you prefer [Case, Plan and
Option changed to match each of the six versions].
Response to Case I:
Response to Case II:

Plan A
Option A

Plan B.
Option B.
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EXAMPLE #1
ISSUE:

PUBLIC SAFETY

LIMITED RESOURCES:
$ INVOLVED:

CITY FUNDS

COST OF ONE TRAFFIC LIGHT

PERCEIVED ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES: BASED ON A STUDY DONE BY
YOUR DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, WHICH ESTIMATED THE PROJECTED
NUMBER OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS AT INTERSECTIONS THROUGHOUT THE
CITY:
1. IF YOU HANG A TRAFFIC LIGHT AT THE INTERSECTION OF
X & Y STREETS, VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE PROJECTED 50 MAJOR
ACCIDENTS AT THAT INTERSECTION CAN BE AVOIDED;
2. IF YOU HANG A TRAFFIC LIGHT AT THE INTERSECTION OF
E & Z STREETS, THERE IS A 1/3 CHANCE THAT THE 180
PROJECTED MAJOR ACCIDENTS FOR THE INTERSECTION WILL BE
AVOIDED AND A 2/3 CHANCE THAT NONE OF THE 180 MAJOR
ACCIDENTS WILL BE AVOIDED
WHY VIEWED AS POSITIVE:
PROBABILITIES :

1— 100%

SAFETY OR AVOIDING INJURY
2— 1/3 & 2/3
EXAMPLE #2

ISSUE :

PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

LIMITED RESOURCE:
$ INVOLVED:

CITY REVENUES

COST OF OPERATING ALONG ROUTES

PERCEIVED ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES : DUE TO BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
THE CITY IS CONSIDERING CUTTING BACK ON THE NUMBER OF ROUTES
NOW OFFERED BY THE CITY TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM. AFTER
ESTIMATING FUTURE GROWTH ALONG THE ROUTES AND PROJECTING
DEMAND FOR THE SYSTEM, YOU FEEL THE FOLLOWING ARE YOUR
ALTERNATIVES :
1. IF YOU CUT ROUTE #5, YOU FEEL CERTAIN THAT 10% OF
YOUR PATRONS WILL BE WITHOUT A NEEDED SERVICE;
2. IF YOU CUT ROUTE #3, YOU FEEL THERE IS A 1/3 CHANCE
THAT 36% OF YOUR PATRONS WILL BE WITHOUT SERVICE AND
THERE IS A 2/3 CHANCE THAT NO PATRONS WILL BE WITHOUT A
NEEDED SERVICE.
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WHY VIEWED AS NEGATIVE:
PROBABILITIES:

REDUCTION OF SERVICE

1— 100%

2— 1/3 & 2/3
EXAMPLE #3

ISSUE:

PRIVATIZATION OF TRASH COLLECTION

LIMITED RESOURCE:
$ INVOLVED:

CITY FUNDS

CONTRACT PRICE (VERY CLOSE BETWEEN BIDDERS)

PERCEIVED OUTCOMES: AFTER A REVIEW OF THE BID PROPOSALS AND
PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS WITH BIDDERS, THERE IS SOME CHANCE
THAT CONTRACTORS CAN PROVIDE CUSTOMERS SOME SAVINGS OF
CURRENT COLLECTION CHARGES. THE TWO ALTERNATIVES ARE:
1. CONTRACTOR #1 GUARANTEES A 5% SAVINGS IN ANNUAL
COLLECTION CHARGES.
2. CONTRACTOR #2 IS 20% CONFIDENT IT CAN PROVIDE 30%
SAVINGS AND 80% CONFIDENT IT CAN PROVIDE NO SAVINGS.
WHY PERCEIVED POSITIVE:
PROBABILITIES:

POTENTIAL CUSTOMER SAVINGS.

1— 100%

2— 20% & 80%

EXAMPLE #4
ISSUE:

ATTRACTING INDUSTRY TO THE AREA

LIMITED RESOURCE:
$ INVOLVED:

CITY LAND

VALUE OF LAND

PERCEIVED ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES:
1. IF CO. A BUILDS A PLANT ON THE DONATED LAND, IT
GUARANTEES 30 JOBS WILL BE AVAILABLE;
2. IF CO. B BUILDS A PLANT ON THE DONATED LAND, IT IS
20% CERTAIN NO JOBS WILL BE AVAILABLE AND IT IS 80%
CERTAIN THAT 40 JOBS WILL BE AVAILABLE
WHY PERCEIVED POSITIVE:
PROBABILITIES :

1— 100%

CREATING JOBS
2— 20% & 80%
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